A RAND NOTE

CETA: IS IT EQUITABLE FOR WOMEN?

Sue E. Berryman, Winston K. Chow, Robert M. Bell

May 1981

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Prepared For

The National Commission for Employment Policy



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DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to the memory of its co-author, Winston K. Chow. Winston was killed in an automobile accident on November 22, 1980, at the age of 29. He was a talented statistician and an integral part of several research teams at Rand. Far more important, he had the unarmored warmth and joy usually found only in children, with the maturity and sensitivity sometimes found in adults. With his death a light went out for all who knew him.

PREFACE

The National Commission for Employment Policy funded the research reported in this Note under Contract 99-0-2716-50-47, issued by the U.S. Department of Labor contracts office. The text served as a background paper for the Commission's conference on sex equity in the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) program, held in Washington, D.C., on September 17 and 18, 1980. The Department of Labor conducted analyses of the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS) data base required in preparing the paper.

This paper should interest policymakers concerned with the conduct of CETA, groups concerned about the equitable distribution of federal program resources between men and women, and researchers who plan to use the CLMS data base.

SUMMARY

This Note assesses whether the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) equitably allocates its training, employment, occupational, and wage benefits by sex. Two policy issues motivate the research, the first being legal. CETA represents a \$9.4 billion federal program. Does it operate in conformity with federal law on nondiscrimination by sex? The second issue is economic. Unrelated females and female family heads and their dependents have much higher poverty rates than their male counterparts: 33 percent versus 7 percent. In families headed by males 8 percent of the related children under 18 years of age are poor; in families headed by females, 51 percent of such children are poor. Wives' earnings reduced by 40 percent the number of husband-wife families that would have been poor and by a third the number of children who would have resided in poor husband-wife families. These data show the relevance of antidiscrimination laws to federal programs that control training and employment resources. Much more is at stake than simple legalism or women's access to "pin money."

CETA has certain resources to distribute and some discretion about how to distribute them by sex. These opportunities include participation in CETA itself, the specific CETA activity (e.g., classroom training versus a job), training or experience in traditional male or mixed occupations, CETA wages, and post-CETA placement.

How CETA distributes these resources by sex has no automatic equity implications. Even equal distributions by sex do not necessarily mean

equitable distributions. Equity can be assessed only relative to some standard--i.e., to some socially accepted rule that establishes how resources should be distributed. Here we use as a standard the informed preferences of eligible participants.

Policymakers should know both CETA's equity record and which inequities matter. To help place inequities in perspective, we had hoped to estimate the consequences of in-program inequities. However, the sample sizes were too small to allow these analyses. In-CETA wage inequities, of course, translate easily into forgone income.

To analyze the sex equity of CETA's resource distributions, we used data from the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS) for FY76, FY77, and FY78 CETA enrollees. The Bureau of the Census collected these data for the Department of Labor. Respondents were sampled from each quarter's CETA enrollees, interviewed in the quarter after their enrollment, and followed for 36 months.

We conducted separate analyses for youths and adults but report primarily the adult results. We use results for youths for comparative purposes only. Male and female youths should be more similar to each other in background characteristics than male and female adults. If we see the same patterns of sex inequity for youths as we observe for adults, the case for discriminatory practices with regard to adults is strengthened.

PARTICIPATION BY CETA TITLE

During fiscal years 1976-78 adults entered CETA through Titles I, II, or VI. Title I consisted primarily of training (classroom or on-

the-job) and adult work experience (AWE) jobs. Titles II and VI consisted primarily of public service employment (PSE) jobs. Both AWE and PSE involve jobs, but they have different objectives. AWE jobs are expected to transfer income but not necessarily to lead to unsubsidized employment. PSE jobs are expected to move the individual into unsubsidized employment.

Relative to their eligibility, women 18-25 years of age are underrepresented in all CETA Titles for all fiscal years except Title I in

FY78. They are represented in Titles II and VI at only 60 to 75 percent
of the number eligible. If we can assume that eligible males and
females have equal demand for CETA services, females are inequitably
underrepresented in CETA. The demand data required to make this
assessment do not exist for CETA.

PROGRAM ASSIGNMENT WITHIN CETA

We assess the equity of activity assignment in two ways: assignment to Title and assignment to different activities within Title I. Titles II and VI consist almost entirely of PSE, and PSE occurs almost entirely in these Titles. Thus, Title and PSE assignment are confounded. Title I consists of classroom basic skill training, classroom job training, on-the-job training (OJT), income transfer jobs (AWE), and a small component of PSE jobs. Entry into Title I carries several assignment possibilities.

During FY76-78 the eligibility rules for Titles I, II, and VI overlapped substantially, and CETA therefore had some Title assignment discretion. Being assigned to a PSE job in FY76-78 did not necessarily

mean being eligible only for Titles II and VI. Similarly, not being assigned to a PSE job did not necessarily mean not being eligible for Titles II and VI.

Relative to the distribution of all adults, female adults are overassigned to Title I, slightly underassigned to Title II, and underassigned to Title VI. In other words, relative to all adults, women are more apt to be assigned to training and income transfer jobs and less apt to be assigned to PSE jobs. The Title I overassignment of women increases with time; their Title II underassignment decreases with time, and the Title VI underassignment remains constant.

Multivariate analyses show that being female increases the chances of being assigned to Title I relative to Titles II and VI, independent of background characteristics that might be associated with sex and affect Title assignment.

Relative to the distribution of all adults within Title I, adult females are overassigned to classroom training (basic skills and job training), underassigned to OJT, and overassigned to adult work experience. They are underassigned to PSE in FY76 and FY77 and overassigned in FY78. When we control on background characteristics other than sex that might affect Title I activity assignments, adult females are still more likely to be assigned to classroom training than to OJT and to AWE than to PSE.

Preference data show that women are at least as likely as men to get the activity that they wanted at CETA entry. However, for those who wanted job training, females are much more likely to get classroom training than OJT. For those who wanted jobs, they were more likely to

get adult work experience than PSE jobs. These data suggest that, relative to men, CETA integrates women less into the workplace (classroom training rather than OJT) and less into "serious" jobs--i.e., ones intended as transitions to unsubsidized employment).

OCCUPATIONAL DESEGREGATION IN CETA

Across the three fiscal years CETA placed a declining proportion of most adult women in traditional female occupations and a slightly increasing proportion of women in traditional male occupations. The proportions in mixed occupations remained stable.

CETA failed to shift three-quarters of those with pre-CETA traditional female jobs into mixed or traditional male jobs. They failed to retain even half of those with pre-CETA mixed or traditional male jobs in occupations of the same type. Those who shifted from mixed or traditional male occupations usually ended up in traditional female jobs.

On the face of it CETA's occupational desegregation record is not notable. However, we have to judge it partly in relation to their clients' informed occupational preferences. CETA has a poor record for women who had traditional male or mixed occupational preferences at CETA entry. Depending on the fiscal year, CETA placed from 74 to 89 percent of the women with traditional female occupational preferences in these occupations. However, for women with traditional male occupational preferences, CETA placed only 33 to 57 percent in such occupations and for women with mixed occupational preferences, only 43 to 60 percent in mixed occupations.

We do not have data that let us assess whether CETA suggested mixed or traditional male occupations to the 40 percent of their female clients who did not have occupational preferences at CETA entry. We have not analyzed available data to determine if (1) the much larger discontinuities between pre-CETA and in-CETA occupations for those with mixed or traditional male pre-CETA occupations reflect these women's negative experiences with less traditional occupations and demands for traditional ones; or if (2) women with traditional male or mixed occupational prefences at CETA entry who CETA placed in traditional female occupations got occupations that paid much better than their preferred occupations.

IN-CETA WAGES

In general, the adult wage data for CETA, OJT, PSE, and AWE activities show the usual wage differences by sex that we observe outside of CETA. Males made higher wages than females in all CETA activities, the differences being greatest for OJT, less for PSE, and least for AWE.

Relative to Census occupational categories, average hourly wage differences by sex are least for the high status occupations. In some fiscal years females in the professional and managerial occupations made a few cents more per hour than their male counterparts. However, males had systematically higher wages than females for all other occupational categories.

The data also show that adult women get higher wages in CETA's traditional male or mixed occupations than in the traditional female

occupations. CETA's mixed occupations confer the highest wages for women of all three occupational types. Males get higher wages than females in all three occupational types, the wage differences between males and females being greatest for CETA's traditional female occupations and less and about equal for traditional male and mixed occupations.

In the absence of additional analyses, we cannot conclude that CETA pays inequitable wages by sex. For example, age, education, and labor force experience all affect wages, and we were unable to obtain the multivariate analyses that would have let us simultaneously control on several wage-relevant characteristics. However, controls on one variable, educational attainment, did not remove the sex difference in wages, even in OJT, where men and women are presumably equally inexperienced. This analysis suggests that CETA may perpetuate the wage inequities of society.

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Patrick O'Keefe, Jaime Salgado, and Daniel Ryan of the Department of Labor, and Wendy Wolf, Ralph Smith, and Patricia Brenner of the National Commission for Employment Policy provided substantial help in the preparation of this Note. We appreciate all of their contributions. Daniel Ryan professionally and competently performed all of the programming and computer runs for us on DOL's copy of the Westat CLMS tapes. His time investment was substantial. Wendy Wolf monitored the Rand contract in a way that encouraged and strengthened the work. Defacto she became a constructive member of the research team.

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I. POLICY AND ANALYTIC ISSUES

This Note addresses a straightforward question. Does CETA equitably allocate its training, employment, occupational, wage, and placement benefits by sex?

Two policy issues motivate the question, the first issue being legal. CETA represents a \$9.4 billion federal program. Does it operate in conformity with federal law on nondiscrimination by sex? The second issue is economic and arises from the incidence of poverty among unrelated females, [1] families headed by females, and husband-wife families.

In 1978 about 11 percent or 24-1/2 million Americans lived below the federally defined poverty level. Poverty implies stress and hardship, whether it involves unrelated males or females, or families headed by males or females. However, the burden of poverty in the United States falls disproportionately on unrelated adult females and on female family heads and their dependents.[2]

o More than half--about 13 million--poor Americans are unrelated females or female family heads and their dependents.

^[1] The Bureau of the Census defines an "unrelated individual" as follows: all persons 14 years old and over, other than inmates of institutions, who are not living with any relatives. Thus, an unrelated individual may constitute a one-person household, be part of a household containing one or more other families or unrelated individuals, or reside in group quarters such as a rooming house.

^[2] Unless otherwise indicated, all data on female poverty come from the Bureau of the Census, <u>Current Population Reports</u>, Series P-60, No. 124, July 1980, Table 1, pp. 16-18.

- o Relative to their male counterparts, unrelated females and female family heads and their dependents have much higher poverty rates: 33 percent versus 7 percent, or a third versus a fifteenth.
- o In families headed by males, 4 million or about 8 percent of the related children under 18 years of age are poor. In families headed by females, 5-1/2 million or 51 percent of the children are poor.
- o Under certain assumptions divorce alone causes 35 percent of the nation's children to spend some time in single-parent families before age 16.[3] Most children in divorced families reside in families headed by a female. If poverty rates are the same for the children of divorced as for the children of all female family heads (51 percent), about 18 percent of the nation's children spend some time in poverty before age 16 as the result of divorce alone.[4]
- o Between 1959 and 1978 the poverty rates declined for male and female unrelated individuals and male and female-headed families. However, the rates of decline differed substantially

^[3] Bumpass and Rindfuss use the divorce rates for the period 1970-73 to estimate the cumulative proportion of children who would experience parental marital disruption by age 16. Larry Bumpass and Ronald R. Rindfuss, "Children's Experience of Marital Disruption," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 1, July 1979, pp. 49-65.

^[4] The Bumpass and Rindfuss estimates do not include children born before a woman's first marriage or children of widowed mothers. Thus, their numbers underestimate the total number of the nation's children who will spend some time in a single-parent family--usually a family headed by a female.

by sex: Female poverty declined by only about a third while male poverty declined by almost two-thirds.

A special analysis by the Bureau of the Census shows that of the total number of husband-wife families in March 1979, 2.474 million or 5 percent had 1978 incomes below the poverty level. Poor families had 3.854 million children or 7.8 percent of the total children in husband-wife families. Of those families above the poverty level, 1.585 million families or 4 percent would have been below the poverty level without the wife's 1978 earnings. Wives' earnings reduced the number of husband-wife families who would have been poor by 40 percent. These earnings reduced the number of children who would have resided in poor husband-wife families by 1.866 million, or by a third.[5]

The data reveal substantial female poverty, with clear economic impacts on the children lodged in female-headed families. They reveal the number of husband-wife families and the number of children in those families who would have been poor in the absence of wives' earnings. In other words, these data show the relevance of anti-discrimination laws to federal programs that control training and employment resources.

Much more is at stake than simple legalism or women's access to "pin money."

To assess the sex equity of CETA's resource distribution, we address three analytic issues. Descriptively, what is the case by sex? Is the case inequitable by sex? If sex inequity occurs, where is it of particular policy concern?

^[5] These data come from the March 1979 <u>Current Population Survey</u> and reflect respondents' incomes for 1978. Carol Fendler and Vicky Virgin, members of the Population Division of the Bureau of the Census, kindly conducted this analysis for us.

CETA has certain opportunities or resources to distribute and some discretion about how to distribute them by sex. These opportunities include participation in CETA itself, the specific CETA activity (e.g., classroom training or a job), training or experience in traditional male occupations, CETA wages, and CETA post-program job placement. We have to know how these resources are allocated by sex before we can assess their equity.

How CETA distributes resources by sex has no automatic equity implications. Even equal distributions by sex do not necessarily mean equitable distributions. Equity can be assessed only relative to some socially accepted rule that establishes how resources should be distributed. [6] For example, whatever the CETA participation ratio of males to females, are women over- or under-represented relative to eligibility rules? Do equally eligible males and females have equal demands or preferences for CETA? Relative to their eligibility, women may be under-represented in CETA, but have less demand for CETA services. If we accept that individual preferences should determine the distribution of opportunities, women may be equitably represented in CETA relative to those preferences.

^[6] Joseph Berger, Bernard P. Cohen, and Morris Zelditch, Jr.,
"Status Characteristics and Expectation States," in Joseph Berger,
Morris Zelditch, Jr., and Bo Anderson (eds.), Sociological Theories in
Progress, Vol. I, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966, pp. 29-46;
Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., Bo Anderson, and Bernard P. Cohen,
"Structural Aspects of Distributive Justice: A Status-Value
Formulation," in Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., and Bo Anderson
(eds.), Sociological Theories in Progress, Vol. II, Houghton Mifflin
Company, Boston, 1972, pp. 119-146; Sue Berryman Bobrow (nee Sue E.
Berryman), Balance Theory of Distributive Justice and Experimental Tests
of Derived Consequences, 1972, Johns Hopkins University, Ph.D.
dissertation.

Finally, even if we observe inequity by sex in CETA, where should corrective--i.e., redistributive--policy be targeted? This choice is the prerogative of the political process and cannot be made here. However, analyses can illuminate the consequences of choosing different corrective priorities.

Corrective policies can be targeted on some and not other CETA resources--e.g., basic skill training, on-the-job training, jobs, or placement services. Presumably sex inequities in access to CETA resources with more payoff matter more than access to ones with less. Analysis will establish whether and how CETA resources vary in their in-program and post-program benefits for women.

Corrective policies can also be targeted on some and not other subgroups of women now eligible for CETA resources. These resources are too limited to serve all those eligible for CETA services—whether male or female. If sex inequities exist in CETA and are corrected, some, but by no means all, eligible women will benefit.

The choice of who benefits from corrective policies can be left to local discretion or made explicitly at the federal level. In the latter case, policymakers have at least three bases for choosing from among eligibles: those who can most be helped, those who most need help, or those who most demonstrate a desire to be helped.[7] The choices here are primarily political or value choices; analyses can do little to illuminate them.

^[7] The National Commission for Employment Policy differentiated these three criteria in Expanding Employment Opportunities for Disadvantaged Youth, Report No. 9, December 1979, pp. 80-82.

II. DATA BASE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ANALYSIS

To examine the three analytic issues--what is the case, is it inequitable, where does sex inequity carry the greatest costs--we relied on analyses of data from the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS). Sponsored by the Employment and Training Administration of the Department of Labor, this survey is of CETA participants.

The CLMS samples mainly decentralized CETA programs--i.e., formula-funded programs operated by CETA prime sponsors. Special purpose programs such as the Job Corps (Title IV), Young Adult Conservation Corps (Title VIII), and several Title III programs are not included in the CLMS file.

The CLMS has two main objectives. First, it is designed to obtain profiles of the CETA participants, thus providing data not available from the prime sponsor reporting system. These profiles include preprogram, in-program, and post-program information. Second, the CLMS is intended to measure the effect of CETA programs on participants, including earnings and labor force status.

The Bureau of the Census has conducted the CLMS quarterly since January 1975, sampling respondents from the previous quarter's new enrollees in CETA. Respondents are sampled from four CETA functional activities: public service employment, employability development, direct referrals,[1] and youth work experience (including summer programs). At the initial interview the Bureau obtains histories of

^[1] In a direct referral CETA refers the individual to a job vacancy. The individual does not receive any other CETA services and does not necessarily get the job to which he or she is referred.

enrollees' employment and schooling activities for the year before CETA enrollment, dependence on public benefits before entry, demographic characteristics and family composition at entry, primary reason for CETA enrollment, and attitudes toward manpower programs and services received.

The Bureau attempts a first followup for all respondents at 9 months after CETA enrollment for the 1975-1977 respondents and at 12 months for post-1977 respondents. The data collected include post-program earnings and labor force experiences, family composition, and dependence on public benefits.

For respondents enrolled in CETA's employability development and public service employment programs, the Bureau attempts second and third followups at 18 and 36 months for the 1975-1977 respondents and at 24 and 36 months for the post-1977 respondents. The data obtained at these interviews are similar to those in the first followup.

The CLMS also collects termination information and data on inprogram activities and services from prime sponsor records for all
respondents who have been terminated from the program. These data can
be linked to the interview data to analyze the effects of types and
levels of activities and services on respondents' post-CETA experiences.

Because youth and adult participants differ in pre-CETA characteristics, labor market opportunities, and CETA eligibility, we conducted separate analyses for youth (< 22 years of age) and adults (≥ 22 years of age).[2] We also conducted all analyses for three fiscal

^[2] Because all analyses were conducted separately by age, participants for whom age was missing were excluded from the analysis.

years: FY76, 77, and 78.[3] The data exclude the transition quarter (July-September 1976). All data represent weighted estimates of persons newly enrolled in CETA.[4]

We rely primarily on cross-tabular analyses, with a few multivariate analyses.[5] The results are presented in four sections:

(1) the sex equity of participation by CETA Title, (2) the sex equity of participation by CETA activities (e.g., OJT), (3) CETA's record on training or employing women in nontraditional occupations, and (4) sex equity of in-CETA wages.

Each section concentrates on two analytic issues: What is the case, and Is it equitable? We do not address the third issue very much--what difference an inequity makes. The importance of any wage

^[3] Data on CETA Title were not collected until the second quarter of FY76. Thus, the analyses by Title for FY76 include only the last three quarters of FY76. FY79 data were not fully available at the time of our request.

^[4] CLMS enrollment counts (i.e., the number of participants) are typically lower by approximately 15 percent than the enrollment reported by prime sponsors in the administrative data. The reasons for this difference are:

⁽a) CLMS excludes the four rural CEPs, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Trust Territories. These sponsors account for about 2 percent of reported CETA participants.

⁽b) Inter-title transfers are not eligible for CLMS sampling. About 5 percent of new enrollees reported by prime sponsors are intertitle transfers.

⁽c) The CLMS definition of a CETA participant changed in FY78 to exclude those who were not enrolled in a program activity--classroom training, public service employment, etc. Approximately 7 percent of CETA participants are not enrolled in a program activity, but receive only supplementary CETA services.

^[5] Multivariate analyses control simultaneously on several factors that might affect female outcomes. Within the set of measured variables, they show whether individuals who are alike on all outcomerelated background characteristics except sex have different outcomes. If sex affects outcomes after the effects of other outcome-related characteristics have been removed, the case for sex inequity is stronger.

inequity is immediately clear. An average wage difference between men and women of, for example, 50 cents an hour easily translates into forgone income. However, we need post-program data to assess other CETA effects--e.g., post-program employment, wages, additional schooling. We also need multivariate analyses that let us control for pre-CETA differences. Attempts to do these analyses ran into serious cell size problems, especially for FY77 and FY78.

We concentrate on the sex equity of CETA for adult females and include youth tables only for comparisons. We assume that female and male youths are more similar to each other than older males and females are in characteristics that might affect CETA entry, CETA program and occupational assignments, and in-CETA wages. For example, pre-CETA labor market experience may affect program assignment. Although male and female youths may differ in the kinds of jobs they have held, they should differ trivially on amount of labor market experience. If we see the same patterns of sex inequity in the youth as in the adult data, the case for discriminatory practices is strengthened.

III. PARTICIPATION BY CETA TITLE

During the fiscal years 1976-78 adults entered CETA through Titles I,[1] II,[2] or VI.[3] Title I consisted primarily of training (classroom or on-the-job) and adult work experience (AWE) jobs. Titles II and VI consisted primarily of public service employment (PSE) jobs. Both AWE and PSE involve jobs, but they have different objectives. AWE jobs are expected to transfer income, but not necessarily to operate as bridges into unsubsidized employment. PSE jobs are expected to move the individual into unsubsidized employment.

^[1] For FY76-78 the eligibility rules for Title I classroom training, OJT, and adult work experience (AWE) jobs were defined as being economically disadvantaged or unemployed or under-employed. Title I had a small public service employment (PSE) component. For Title I PSE jobs the rules were defined as residing in the prime sponsor's area and being unemployed or under-employed or economically disadvantaged.

^[2] For FY76-78 the eligibility rules for Title II PSE jobs were defined as residing in an area of substantial unemployment and being either unemployed for at least 30 days prior to application or underemployed.

^[3] From October 1975 to December 1976, the eligibility rules for Title VI were defined as residing in the prime sponsor's jurisdiction and as being unemployed at least 30 days prior to application, or, in areas of excessively high unemployment, unemployed at least 15 days; or being underemployed. In January 1977, Title VI was divided into "sustainment" (Title VIA) and "nonsustainment" (Title VIB) levels, the latter level referring to jobs of limited duration. For Title VIA up to 50 percent of the participants had to meet the eligibility criteria operative from October 1975, to December 1976.

The eligibility criteria for at least the remaining 50 percent of the Title VIA participants and for all Title VIB participants changed three times in the period from January 1977, to September 1978. The changes were not major. The basic rules were defined as (a) being economically disadvantaged or a member of a family whose total family income was ≤ 70 percent of the Bureau of Labor Statistics lower living standard; and (b) residing in the prime sponsor's jurisdiction; and (c) being a member of an AFDC family, or unemployed for a specified number of weeks prior to application and receiving unemployment insurance or being ineligible for unemployment insurance, or being an unemployment insurance exhaustee.

Table 1 shows for FY76-78 the percentage of CETA participants 18-65 in each Title who are female.[4] For each Title the proportion female enrolled increases across time. Table 2 shows eligibility estimates by sex for Titles I, II/VIA, and VIB[5] for the 1975 population. These estimates use the eligibility rules operative in FY78.

If we assume that estimates for the 1975 population generalize to FY76-78 populations, Figure 1 shows that relative to their eligibility, women 18-65 are underrepresented in all CETA Titles for all three fiscal years except Title I for FY78. Even though the female proportion enrolled increases across time, FY78 females still have only a 3:4 to 3:5 participation/eligibility ratio for the PSE Titles (Titles II and VI).

Table 1

FEMALE PARTICIPATION BY TITLE

(Percent)

Year	Title I	Title II	Title VI	Total
FY76	44.4	34.6	34.4	41.8
FY77	47.9	39.5	34.8	43.7
FY78	52.5	41.6	37.4	45.5

^[4] Because the eligibility estimates apply to individuals 18-65 years of age, we used this age specification for the analysis of participation by Title by sex. All other analyses distinguish adults and youths as defined earlier.

^[5] As we show below, we have no eligibility estimates for Title II and Title VI separately. All of the more appropriate analyses estimate eligibility for Title II and Title VIA (PSE sustainment) together and for Title VIB (PSE nonsustainment) separately.

Table 2

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE 1975 ELIGIBLE POPULATION BY SEX AND RACE FOR CETA TITLES I, II, AND VI^{b}

Population	Title I	Title II/VIA ^{b, c}	Title VIB
Total number (thousands)	26,723	13,205	6,883
Sex Male Female	45.1 54.9	45.8 54.2	35.1 64.9
Race/Ethnicity White Black Hispanic Other	72.8 17.3 7.8 2.1	71.6 18.4 7.9 2.1	59.4 28.4 10.2 1.9

An Analysis of the Issues, National Commission for Manpower Policy, Special Report William Barnes, "Target Groups," in CETA: No. 23, May 1978, pp. 103-104. SOURCE:

 $^{\mathrm{a}}$ The eligible population is defined on the basis of the 1976 survey The numbers represent persons eligible at some point during 1975 according to the eligibility rules operative in early 1978. Disabled persons and persons younger than 18 or older than 65 were excluded from the estimates. of Income and Education (SIE).

 $^{
m b}$ Title VI was divided in FY77 into Title VIA (PSE sustainment) and Title VIB (PSE nonsustainment).

upon a population that included poor persons with no work experience ^CThe characteristics of Title II and VIA populations were based during the year.




Fig. 1. Female participation in and eligibility for CETA titles by fiscal year

If we assume that male and female eligibles have equal demand for CETA services, Fig. 1 also shows that females 18-65 were <u>inequitably</u> underrepresented in the PSE Titles for all three fiscal years and in Title I for FY76-77.[6]

Unfortunately we know of no completely appropriate eligibility estimates for the FY76-78 population and the FY76-78 CETA period. We located four separate estimates:[7] The Barnes,[8] CBO 1978,[9] CBO (1980)[10],

^[6] We only have separate youth eligibility estimates by sex for Title III for the 1975 population. (See Table A.3) These estimates assume FY78 CETA eligibility regulations. Relative to the percentage females in Titles IIIA, IIIC.2, and IIIC.3 (Table A.2), they indicate almost a 1:1 female participation:eligibility ratio for female youth in Title IIIA (the summer youth program) and Title IIIC.3 (YETP). They show a 1:2 ratio for Title IIIC.2 (the YCCIP program). If we assume that eligibility rates for female youths and females 18-65 are the same for Titles I and II/VIA, we see participation:eligibility ratios for female youths similar to those observed for female adults: about 0.9:1 for Title I and 3:5 for Titles II/VIA.

^[7] These four estimates differ on several dimensions. William Barnes, "Target Groups," in CETA: An Analysis of the Issues, National Commission on Manpower Policy, Special Report No. 23, May 1978, used retrospective data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education (SIE). He assumed FY78 eligibility regulations. The data covered the year 1975, and he estimated eligibility numbers and rates for Titles I, II/VIA, and VIB for the 1975 populations. Title IV was divided into VIA and VIB (PSE sustainment and PSE nonsustainment) in January 1977. The CBO 1978 estimates used current data from the survey of Income and Education. The data were point-in-time (spring 1976). This document estimates eligibility for the 1975 population for Titles I and VI under FY78 CETA eligibility assumptions. The CBO 1980 analysis used March 1978 Current Population Survey data and assumed FY78 CETA eligibility regulations. It projected eligibility estimates for the 1980 population for Titles II and VI. The Cohen and Mueller estimates assumed April 1979 CETA eligibility regulations that went into effect after the CETA reauthorization. Thus, even though their estimates cover FY76, 77, and 78, we cannot use them because the CETA eligibility requirements changed so dramatically under the reauthorization.

^[8] Barnes, 1978.

^[9] Congressional Budget Office, <u>CETA Reauthorization Issues</u>, Resources and Community Development Division, August 1978.

^[10] Congressional Budget Office, "Changes in the PSE Eligible and Participating Populations After the 1978 CETA Reauthorization," Staff Draft Analysis, Human Resources and Community Development Division, May 1980.

and Cohen/Mueller estimates.[11] We chose the Barnes estimates. They covered all Titles, used eligibility rules that applied for all or much of the FY76-78 period, and used a more defensible methodology (total year, as opposed to a point-in-time estimate).

For our purposes these estimates have two obvious potential problems. They apply to the 1975 calendar year population. This population overlaps with only the first half of FY76. The numbers—and therefore relative proportions—of men and women who met the eligibility criteria may have changed across FY76—78. At the same time, we use eligibility proportions in assessing CETA equity by sex, and proportions are much less sensitive than absolute numbers to different base years.[12]

Barnes also used FY78 eligibility criteria. These criteria remained constant across FY76-78 for Titles I and II. For Title VI they changed in January 1977, in ways that might have affected the proportions of male and female eligibles. Thus, for Title VI the Barnes estimates are more questionable for FY76 and the first quarter of FY77. However, even if we restrict our equity judgment on Title VI to FY78, we still find females substantially underrepresented.

In sum, the Barnes eligibility estimates by sex do not seem sufficiently biased to invalidate our conclusion that relative to their

^[11] Malcolm Cohen (University of Michigan) and Charles Mueller (formerly of the Brookings Institution) constructed eligibility estimates for the Department of Labor.

^[12] Eligibility estimates are sensitive to several variables-e.g., the assumed eligibility rules, the data base (CPS or SIE), a point-in-time versus total year estimate, an eligible stock versus flow estimate, and the calendar year for which the estimate is made. However, in a personal communication CBO analysts report that these variables affect absolute numbers much more than they do proportions.

eligibility, females are substantially underrepresented in the PSE

Titles for all fiscal years. However, we do not know if they are
inequitably underrepresented relative to their demand for CETA services.

Furthermore, the data necessary for estimating demand for CETA by sex do
not exist. Latent demand refers to demand that exists if all eligibles
know about CETA services; applicant demand is evidenced by CETA
applications. Several studies have shown that nontrivial numbers of
individuals do not know about federal programs for which they are
eligible.[13] At least one study has shown that even informed
individuals often do not apply for such programs.[14] The
characteristics of the uninformed and the nonparticipant informed vary
by program. In the absence of relevant data about CETA, therefore, we
cannot assume that eligible males and females do not differ in their
information about CETA or in their propensity to apply.

^[13] Susan Welch, Michael Steinman, and John Comer, "Where Have All the Clients Gone? An Examination of the Food Stamp Program," Public Welfare, Vol. 31, 1973, pp. 48-54; Oliver Moles, Robert F. Hess, and Daniel Fascione, "Who Knows Where to Get Public Assistance?" Welfare in Review, Vol. 6, 1968, pp. 8-13; Phyllis Ellickson, Who Applies for Housing Allowances? The Rand Corporation, R-2632-HUD, forthcoming.

^[14] Ellickson found that despite an extensive outreach campaign, less than 50 percent of the eligible households enrolled at one site of the Housing Allowance Supply Experiment. Lack of information was only one reason that eligibles failed to apply for the program.

IV. ACTIVITY ASSIGNMENT

A CETA entrant is assigned to an activity. CETA activities include training, employment, direct referral to a job vacancy, and other services. We restrict our analysis to training and employment activities.

The question about equity of activity assignment is simple. Do we find that being male or female affects the activity assignments of individuals who have identical assignment-relevant characteristics--for example, previous labor force history? If sex affects assignment, what difference it makes obviously depends on the relationship between in-CETA and post-CETA experiences. We are dealing here only with whether sex affects assignment.

Titles II and VI consist almost entirely of PSE and PSE occurs almost entirely in these Titles; therefore, Title and PSE assignments are confounded. In other words, entry into Titles II and VI almost always means a PSE assignment; getting a PSE assignment almost always means being in Titles II and VI. Entry into Title I carries several assignment possibilities—classroom basic skill training, classroom job training, on—the—job training (OJT), income transfer jobs (AWE), and a small component of PSE jobs.

We assess the equity of activity assignment in two ways: assignment to Title and assignment to different activities within Title I. During FY76-78 the eligibility rules for Titles I, II, and VI overlapped substantially, and CETA therefore had some Title assignment discretion. Thus, being assigned to a PSE job in FY76-78 did not

necessarily mean being eligible only for Titles II and VI. Similarly, not being assigned to a PSE job did not necessarily mean not being eligible for Titles II and VI.

For each fiscal year Table 3 shows the distributions across Titles of all adults, all adult males, and all adult females. Relative to the distribution of all adults, female adults are overrepresented in Title I, slightly underrepresented in Title II, and underrepresented in Title VI.[1] In other words, relative to the distribution of all CETA participants, women are more apt to enter training and income transfer jobs and are less apt to enter PSE jobs. The Title I overrepresentation of women increases with time (from 1.08 in FY76 to 1.17 in FY78).[2] Their Title II underrepresentation decreases with time (from 0.76 to 0.91),[3] and their Title VI underrepresentation remains stable at about 0.84.

The relationship between sex and Title assignment may just signal different sex distributions of assignment-relevant characteristics.

These characteristics may determine eligibility (e.g., unemployment) or preferable assignment. For example, a woman may be eligible for all three Titles; however, if she has little education, she might be more sensibly placed in basic skills or job training (Title I) than in a public service job (usually Titles II or VI).

We conducted a logistic regression analysis to assess the effects of sex on Title assignment, independent of other characteristics that

^[1] In this analysis the sample sizes are so large that all overor under-assignments are statistically significant at any selected level.

^[2] This change is statistically significant at p < .01.

^[3] This change is statistically significant at p < .01.

Table 3

ADULT PARTICIPATION BY TITLE (Percent)

		Title	Н	L	Title I	II	H	Title VI	I
Sex/Race	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Female	74.5	65.5	53.9	5.0	9.8	8.2	20.4	24.7	37.9
White	68.8	62.7	51.5	6.9	11.3	6.6	24.3	26.0	38.7
Black	81.2	66.5	53.6	2.8	7.3	6.1	16.0	26.2	40.2
Hispanic	81.4	74.6	62.6	3.6	6.6	4.3	15.1	15.5	33.1
Other	87.2	74.3	4.99	0	7.9	0.6	12.8	17.8	24.7
							-		
Male	65.0	53.6	39.2	7.7	11.5	9.6	27.2	34.9	51.2
White	58.5	48.7	36.0	9.1	13.6	11.1	32.4	37.7	52.9
Black	72.4	55.5	39.8	5.7	8.4	7.7	21.8	36.1	52.5
Hispanic	78.7	69.1	50.7	5.9	8.7	5.9	15.4	22.2	43.4
Other	79.0	71.9	54.3	5.3	8.6	7.7	15.6	19.6	38.0
Tota1	0.69	58.7	45.9	9.9	10.8	0.6	24.4	30.5	45.2
Ratio of Fe- male to Total Participation	1.08	1.12	1.17	0.76	0.91	0.91	0.84	0.81	0.84

might affect placement. Logistic regression is similar to ordinary multiple regression except that the dependent variable is dichotomous rather than continuous. It models the probability of a particular event, such as placement in Title I, as a function of background characteristics.

The analysis simultaneously regressed on sex, race, age, economic status at CETA entry, labor force status in the pre-CETA year, veteran status, educational status, and the national unemployment rate by sex and race, lagged by one quarter from the quarter of CETA entry.[4] We selected variables that indicated either Title eligibility (e.g., labor force status in the pre-CETA year) or the appropriateness of a training over a job placement (e.g., educational status).

The model also tested for interactions between sex and race and between sex and labor force status in the pre-CETA year. There were no statistically significant interaction effects for any fiscal year except for a small effect for hispanic females in FY77.

The analysis reveals that being female increases the chances of being placed in Title I rather than in Titles II and VI, independent of

^[4] Race was defined as white, black, hispanic, and other. Age was defined as 22-29, 30-44, and ≥ 45 years. Economic status at CETA entry had four categories: recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (for mothers and unemployed fathers); recipient of other types of public assistance; poor relative to the OMB poverty level, but not a recipient of public assistance; and not poor relative to the OMB poverty level. Labor force status in the pre-CETA year was defined as: predominantly employed (≥ 90 percent employed); predominantly unemployed (≥ 50 percent unemployed); substantially unemployed (25-49 percent unemployed); not in the labor force; and any residual combination of labor force experiences. Educational status was defined as: less than high school completion, in school; less than high school completion, out of school; high school graduate or GED and out of school; beyond high school and in school; beyond high school and out of school.

the effects of other measured characteristics that might affect placement. Table 4 reports the logistic regression coefficients for sex. Although standard errors and t values operate for logistic regression coefficients in the same way as for ordinary regression coefficients, logistic regression coefficients cannot be interpreted in the same way as ordinary regression coefficients. Table 5 shows the implications of the logistic regression coefficients for the probabilities that a woman will be placed in Title I, relative to a man who is identical to her in all characteristics except sex. For example, if a man has characteristics that give him a 10 percent chance of being assigned to Title I and the logistic regression coefficient is 0.80, Table 5 shows that a comparable woman has almost a 20 percent chance of a Title I assignment. The effect of being female on Title placement is

Table 4

EFFECT OF BEING FEMALE ON PLACEMENT IN TITLE I

VS. TITLES II AND VI

		Fiscal Yea	ır
Effects	FY76	FY77	FY78
Logistic regression coefficients	0.80	0.77	0.76
Standard errors	<u>+</u> 0.09	<u>+</u> 0.07	<u>+</u> 0.06
t-statistic	8.9*	11.0*	12.7*

 $[\]ddot{s}$ Statistically significant at p < 0.001.

Table 5

FEMALE RELATIVE TO MALE PROBABILITY OF TITLE I PLACEMENT FOR DIFFERENT LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS

		Probability I Placement	
Male Probability of Title I Placement	β _F =0.40	β _F =0.60	β _F =0.80
.10	0.142	0.168	0.198
.20	0.272	0.313	0.357
.30	0.390	0.438	0.488
.40	0.499	0.548	0.597
.50	0.599	0.646	0.690
.60	0.691	0.732	0.769
.70	0.777	0.810	0.839
.80	0.856	0.879	0.899
. 90	0.931	0.943	0.952

greatest relative to males with a 30 to 50 percent chance of being placed in Title I. In this range and for a 0.80 logistic regression coefficient, women have a 20 percent greater chance of a Title I assignment--e.g., 60 rather than 40 percent--than comparable men.

We might expect male and female youths to be more similar in assignment-relevant characteristics than adults. We do find that, whereas female adults are overassigned to Title I, female youths are assigned to this Title in the same proportions as all youths. However, female youths and female adults have similar patterns for Titles II and VI. (See Table A.4.)

Table 6 shows the distribution across Title I activities of all

Title I participants, adult females in Title I, and adult males in Title

I. Relative to the distribution of all Title I adults, females are

Table 6
ADULT PARTICIPATION IN TITLE I BY IPA ASSIGNMENT (Percent)

		IJ			OJI			AWE			PSE	
Sex/Race	FY 76	FY 7.7	FY78	FY 76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY 7.7	FY78	FY 76	FY 77	FY 78
Female	56.1	56.5	59.2	15.0	14.2	16.7	23.8	25.6	22.3	5.2	3.7	1.8
White	46.5	48.2	54.6	15.4	16.4	19.6	31.0	27.9	23.5	7.1	7.5	2.4
Black	59.4	62.5	62.6	14.6	12.2	13.5	22.8	22.0	22.2	3.2	3.2	1.7
Hispanic	68.5	8.69	66.3	18.0	8.1	13.9	12.1	21.1	19.8	1.4	H	0
Other	70.4	67.2	71.0	2.7	9.0	10.5	24.0	21.3	18.5	2.8	2.4	0
Male	43.8	41.1	42.7	23.7	29.5	35.7	23.5	22.9	20.1	0.6	6.4	1.5
White	34.8	34.0	38.7	29.1	33.7	41.1	24.3	24.4	18.5	11.8	8.0	1.7
Black	58.2	50.6	9.67	12.8	21.6	26.0	23.1	20.4	23.1	5.9	7.4	1.7
Hispanic	49.5	47.3	44.1	23.1	30.2	37.3	21.4	20.3	18.2	0.9	2.2	0.4
Other	52.4	57.8	0.64	21.3	17.5	24.3	21.9	22.9	25.6	4.4	.8	1.1
Total	49.4	48.8	51.8	19.7	22.0	25.3	23.6	24.2	21.3	7.3	5.1	1.6
Ratio of Fe-	r Solver	1	:. . ·				4 '					
Participation 1.28	1.28	1.38	1,39	0.63	0.48	0.47	1,01	1,12	1.11	0.58	0.58	1,2

overassigned to classroom training (basic skills and job training), underassigned to OJT, and overassigned to adult work experience. They are underassigned to PSE in FY76 and FY77 and overassigned in FY78. However, by FY78 PSE represented only 1.6 percent of the Title I activities. The classroom overassignment increases with time, moving from a ratio of 1.28 in FY76 to 1.39 in FY78.[5] OJT underassignment increases with time (from 0.63 to 0.47).[6] AWE moves from an even ratio in FY76 to 1.11 in FY78.[7]

Table 7 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis of placement in Title I activities by sex. The analysis used the same independent variables as the analysis for Title placement, except that it added desired CETA service for those who specified their preference at CETA entry.[8] It also tested an additional interaction term, sex and educational status. All interaction effects were either statistically not significant or, if significant, small.

As Table 7 shows, being female rather than male increases the chances of being placed in classroom training rather than in OJT and in AWE rather than in PSE, independent of other characteristics that might affect Title I activity assignment. Table 5 specifies the size of the effect for different logistic regression coefficients. For example, relative to men who have a 50 percent chance of being placed in classroom training, comparable women in FY78 had between a 64.6 and 69 percent chance of a classroom training assignment.

^[5] This increase is statistically significant at p < .05.

^[6] This increase is statistically significant at p < .05.

^[7] This increase is statistically significant at p < .05.

^[8] Desired CETA service had four codes: a job, job training, income, and basic skills.

Table 7

EFFECT OF BEING FEMALE ON PLACEMENT IN TITLE I ACTIVITIES

		Fiscal Ye	ar
Title I Activity	FY76	FY77	FY78
Classroom Training vs. OJT			
Logistic			
regression	0.40	• • • •	0. (0.
coefficient	0.49	1.17	0.69
Standard error	<u>+</u> 0.13	<u>+</u> 0.12	<u>+</u> 0.11
t-statistic (3.8	9.8	6.3
AWE vs. PWE			
Logistic			
regression		0 50	
coefficient	0.58	0.56	0.71
Standard error	<u>+</u> 0.11	<u>+</u> 0.11	<u>+</u> 0.11
t-statistic	5.3 [*]	5.1*	6.5

^{*}Statistically significant at p < .001.

Male and female youth should be more similar in their assignmentrelevant characteristics than adult males and females. However, as with
Title assignment, we find the same patterns of assignment to Title I
activities for female youths as for female adults. (See Tables A.6 and
A.7.) Relative to all youths, female youths are overassigned to
classroom training, underassigned to OJT, and increasingly overassigned
to the youth counterpart of AWE, youth work experience. The Youth

Employment and Training Program (YETP) component of Title III, a CETA youth Title, has assignment alternatives similar to those of Title I:

YETP classroom training, YETP OJT, and YETP work experience. The YETP assignment patterns are similar to those for Title I female youths and for Title I female adults. Relative to all youths in YETP, female youths are overassigned to classroom training, underassigned to OJT, and approximately evenly assigned to work experience. (See Table A.8.)

In sum, relative to all CETA participants, we find adult females overassigned to Title I and underassigned to Titles II and VI. Relative to all Title I participants, we find adult females overassigned to classroom training, underassigned to OJT, and increasingly overassigned to income transfer jobs, AWE. The same results occur even after we control simultaneously on selected background characteristics that might affect Title and Title I activity assignments. Female youths show assignment patterns quite similar to those for female adults, even though theoretically they should be more like their male counterparts than female adults might be to male adults.

Before we interpret these unequal distributions as inequitable, we again have to ask about sex differences in demand for CETA services. We define classroom training as the appropriate service for those who wanted basic skills, classroom training and OJT as the appropriate services for those who wanted job training, and adult work experience and PSE as the appropriate services for those who worked jobs.

Table 8 shows what adult participants who wanted a particular service got. For those who wanted basic skills, females were slightly more likely to get what they wanted than males across all fiscal years.

Table 8

FOR EACH DESIRED SERVICE: ADULT DISTRIBUTION OF OBTAINED CETA SERVICES (Percent)

					Desired	CETA S	Desired CETA Service		•	
40		Bas	Basic Skills	.1s	Jot	Job Training	ing		Job	
CETA Service	Sex	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77 FY78	FY78
Classroom training	Male Female	86.6 91.7	88.7 94.0	87.9	69.7	51.5	45.4	12.0 15.4	7.9	5.7
On-the-job training	Male Female	2.3	2.6	3.2	14.7	15.5	16.2 7.0	12.5 11.4	12.3 8.8	11.3 9.3
Adult work experience	Male Female	9.8	2.1	6.2	10.5	9.9	6.9 10.1	18.5 25.2	12.9 18.3	7.8
Public service employment ^b	Male Female	1.2	6.6 1.4	2.7	14.2	23.1 9.7	31.5 16.0	57.0 48.0	66.9 59.8	75.2 66.4

are included in the tabulation. Column percents sum to 100.0 for males and anny the participants who have expressed their desired CETA services females separately.

bIncludes PSE sustainment, PSE nonsustainment, and PSE unknown in FY78.

(The female:male ratios here are 1.06, 1.06, and 1.04.) For those who wanted job training, females were more likely--and increasingly more likely--than males to get what they wanted. These ratios increased from 1.05 to 1.20 from FY76 to FY78. However, among those who wanted job training, females were more likely than males to get classroom training and less likely to get OJT.

For those who wanted jobs, males were only slightly more likely to get what they wanted for all three fiscal years, the female:male ratios being about 0.97. However, among those who wanted jobs, females were much more likely than males to get adult work experience and less likely to get PSE jobs.

How we interpret these data ultimately depends on what actually goes on in these activities and on their associated in-CETA and post-CETA benefits. However, the data <u>suggest</u> that, relative to men, CETA integrates women less into the workplace (classroom training rather than OJT) and less into "serious" jobs (ones intended as transitions to unsubsidized employment). At the same time, at least the classroom training/OJT difference may just reflect where training for traditional female jobs usually occurs. In this case any inequities resolve into occupational, not activity, assignment issues.

V. OCCUPATIONAL DESEGREGATION IN CETA

Occupational segregation by sex is clearly associated with, although not unambiguously the cause of, female poverty in the United States. Substantially more female than male occupations pay poverty level wages—in one analysis, 54 percent versus 20 percent for a white female high school graduate 25-34 years of age.[1] Persistent occupational segregation parallels the persistent male—female wage differential, and differences in male and female occupational distributions account for over a quarter of the wage differential.[2] Even when labor force attachment is controlled, women also have much flatter lifetime earnings profiles than men.[3] Theoretical arguments[4] and fragmentary evidence[5] implicate occupational segregation in these profile differences. Male, but not female, occupations seem associated with upwardly mobile career paths that carry wage increases.

^[1] Isabel Sawhill, "Discrimination and Poverty among Women Who Head Families," in Martha Blaxall and Barbara Reagan (eds.), Women and the Workplace, The University of Chicago Press, 1976, pp. 201-211.

^[2] Barry Chiswick, J. Fackler, June O'Neill, and Solomon Polacheck, "The Effect of Occupation on Race and Sex Differences in Hourly Earnings," Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, 1974, pp. 219-228.

^[3] Isabel V. Sawhill, "The Economics of Discrimination Against Women: Some New Findings," <u>Journal of Human Resources</u>, Vol. 8, Fall 1973, pp. 383-396.

^[4] Wendy C. Wolf and Rachel Rosenfeld, "Sex Structure of Occupations and Job Mobility," <u>Social Forces</u>, Vol. 56, No. 3, March 1978, pp. 823-844.

^[5] Nancy S. Barrett, "Women in the Job Market: Occupations, Earnings, and Career Opportunities," in Ralph E. Smith (ed.), <u>The Subtle Revolution</u>, The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 39.

The CETA regulatory response to occupational segregation has been to direct prime sponsors to reduce sex stereotyping in training and employment for both sexes. Here we describe CETA's desegregation record and assess it in relation to women's occupational preferences.

In our description of CETA's record, we use the CETA regulatory definitions of occupational types: in a <u>traditional male</u> occupation females constitute less than 25 percent of that occupation's labor force; in a <u>mixed</u> occupation, 25 to 74 percent; and in a <u>traditional</u> female occupation, 75 percent or more.

CETA'S OCCUPATIONAL DESEGREGATION RECORD

Table 9 shows the distribution of CETA job holders among traditional male, traditional female, and mixed CETA jobs by fiscal year, sex, and race. The data show that across time an increasing proportion of adult women were employed in traditional male CETA jobs (7 percent to almost 12 percent in three fiscal years); a decreasing proportion in traditional female CETA jobs (68 percent to 62 percent in three fiscal years); and basically a stable proportion in mixed jobs. Adult females showed slightly more distributional change across time than adult males, but neither sex showed large changes.

Table 10 shows the distribution of CETA jobs by Census occupational categories for adult males and females by fiscal year. Again, females showed more changes across time than males, but neither sex showed much shift. At the same time for both sexes the changes that did occur were

Table 9

ADULT DISTRIBUTION AMONG TRADITIONAL MALE, TRADITIONAL FEMALE,

AND MIXED CETA JOBS

(Percent)

		adition ale Job			adition male Jo		M	ixed Jo	b
Sex/Race	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Female	7.0	12.3	11.7	68.2	64.5	62.2	24.8	23.2	26.1
White	7.8	11.0	12.5	67.4	62.4	60.7	24.8	26.6	26.9
Black	4.9	17.2	11.0	70.2	62.6	63.2	24.9	20.1	25.8
Hispanic	3.5	5.0	8.2	71.4	80. 7	72.0	25.1	14.3	19.8
Other	15.3	7.7	11.3	61.8	82.4	61.1	22.9	9.9	27.6
Male	71.5	71.4	69.7	6.5	8.4	10.0	22.0	20.2	20.3
White	72.9	71.8	70.2	6.4	8.0	8.9	20.7	20.2	20.9
Black	68.2	72.4	70.0	4.9	7.7	10.2	26.9	19.8	19.8
Hispanic	75.4	66.8	69.2	5.5	11.8	13.9	19.1	21.4	16.9
Other	56.1	64.0	60.8	18.3	17.0	18.9	25.5	19.0	20.3

from occupations traditional for their sex to mixed occupations or to occupations nontraditional for their sex. Females showed increasing proportions in the professional/technical category (17 percent to 21 percent) and decreasing proportions in the clerical category (54 percent to 48 percent). They showed very slight increases in the craft, transport operative, and nonfarm laborer categories. Males showed an absolute increase of three percent in the clerical category.

Table 10
DISTRIBUTION OF CETA JOB FOR ADULTS BY CENSUS OCCUPATIONS (Percent)

	F	Y76	F	Y77	F	Y78
Census Occupations	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers	14.0	17.0	14.9	19.4	15.4	21.3
Managers, Administra- tors, except Farm	5.1	3.3	6.0	3.8	4.1	3.1
Salesworkers	0.8	0.9	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.7
Clerical and Kindred Workers	5.5	53.6	7.7	47.3	8.6	47.6
Craftsmen and Kindred Workers	16.2	1.0	14.5	1.2	16.9	1.6
Operatives, except Transport	5.2	1.8	3.8	1.4	3.6	1.2
Transport Equipment Operatives	5.3	0.7	4.6	1.0	4.7	1.5
Non-farm Laborers	25.4	1.3	28.9	4.1	26.7	3.6
Farmers and Farm Man- agers	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Farm Laborers and Super- visors	0.6	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.2
Service Workers, except Private Household	21.8	19.4	18.6	21.0	19.1	18.9
Private Household Workers	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.2
	******		1 to 14			

Table 11 shows the relationship between the two CETA training activities, classroom training and OJT, and traditionality of the occupation being trained. For both adult men and women, training activity has a marked effect on the incidence of traditional and mixed occupations. Relative to OJT, a classroom training assignment for women increases the incidence of traditional female occupations by about two-thirds. It decreases the chances of being in a mixed occupation by

Table 11

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUALS IN CLASSROOM TRAINING AND OJT
BY TRADITIONALITY OF OCCUPATION

	Cla	ssroom Train	ning	On-th	e-Job Train	ing
Fiscal Year and Occupation	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male
FY76						
Traditional Male	37.5	5.9	70.8	45.8	10.6	66.5
Traditional Female	46.9	81.1	10.7	21.8	51.4	4.3
Mixed	15.6	12.9	18.5	32.4	37.9	29.1
FY77						
Traditional Male	37.6	15.3	68.8	48.4	16.8	63.7
Traditional Female	47.9	70.6	16.3	20.2	46.7	7.3
Mixed	14.5	14.1	14.9	31.4	36.5	29.0
FY78				,		
Traditional Male	32.9	9.5	72.3	47.1	13.9	66.1
Traditional Female	51.8	75.9	11.0	19.3	46.9	3.5
Mixed	15.4	14.6	16\.6	33.6	39.2	30.4

about the same amount. Although classroom training assignments decrease female chances of being trained in a traditional male occupation, the effects are not as great as for the other two occupational types.

Table 11 also shows the distribution of classroom training and OJT training slots among the three occupational types. Relative to classroom training, OJT has a larger proportion of traditional male slots, only half or fewer the proportion of traditional female slots, and at least double the proportion of mixed slots. Thus, although OJT has a smaller total number of slots than classroom training, its occupational mix is more conducive to occupational desegregation for women.

Table 12 shows, for each training type, the ratio of the female proportion in an occupational type to the female proportion in the training type. A ratio of 1.00 means that women are represented in a particular occupational type in equal proportion to their representation in the training type. A ratio of less than 1.00 indicates underrepresentation and a ratio of more than 1.00 indicates overrepresentation. These ratios reveal that OJT increases women's chances to be in mixed and traditional male occupations primarily as a function of OJT's occupational mix, not of less traditional occupational assignments for females in OJT. Although females in OJT are somewhat more apt to be assigned to mixed occupations than females in classroom training, they are much more apt to be assigned to traditional female occupations than females in classroom training.

Table 12

FOR EACH TRAINING TYPE: RATIO OF THE FEMALE PROPORTION
IN AN OCCUPATIONAL TYPE TO THE FEMALE PROPORTION IN THE TRAINING TYPE

and Occupation	Classroom Training	On-the-Job-Training
FY76		
Traditional male job	0.16	0.23
Traditional female job	1.73	2.36
Mixed job	0.83	1.17
FY77		,
Traditional male job	0.41	0.35
Traditional female job	1.47	2.32
Mixed job	0.98	1.16
FY78		
Traditional male job	0.29	0.29
Traditional female job	1.47	2.43
Mixed job	0.95	1.17

In the last section we saw that relative to their proportions in Title I, females are overrepresented in classroom training and underrepresented in OJT. Tables 11 and 12 show the consequences of these activity assignments for occupational desegregation for women. OJT contains much larger proportions of traditional male and mixed occupations. Even if women enter the OJT traditional female slots in disproportionate numbers, the small numbers of these slots in OJT force some occupational desegregation. These data indicate that if CETA increases women's OJT participation, they will simultaneously increase occupational desegregation for women.

Tables 13 and 14 show whether, relative to the occupation of their last pre-CETA job, adult female and male CETA job holders stayed in the

Table 13

OCCUPATION OF LAST PRE-CETA JOB BY OCCUPATION OF CETA
JOB FOR ADULT FEMALES

(Percent)

	Occupa	ation of CETA .	Job
Fiscal Year, Pre-CETA Job	Traditional Male Job	Traditional Female Job	Mixed Job
FY76			
Traditional male job	32.8	44.2	23.0
Traditional female job	3.6	80.7	15.7
Mixed job	7.3	41.7	51.0
FY77			
Traditional male job	33.3	45.9	20.9
Traditional female job	8.8	75.2	16.0
Mixed job	11.9	44.8	43.3
FY78			
Traditional male job	43.8	39.8	16.4
Traditional female job	7.4	73.8	18.8
Mixed job	9.9	46.5	43.6

same occupational type or moved to a new one. Thus, for those in pre-CETA occupations traditional for their sex, Tables 13 and 14 show how much CETA changed participants' occupational patterns. For those in pre-CETA mixed occupations or occupations nontraditional for their sex, they show CETA's ability to continue participants' occupational patterns.

About 75 percent of adult females who had traditionally female pre-CETA jobs entered traditionally female CETA jobs. Of those who moved out of traditionally female pre-CETA jobs, about two-thirds entered mixed CETA jobs.

Table 14

OCCUPATION OF LAST PRE-CETA JOB BY OCCUPATION OF CETA

JOB FOR ADULT MALES

(Percent)

	Occup	ation of CETA	Job
Fiscal Year, Pre-CETA Job	Traditional Male Job	Traditional Female Job	Mixed Job
FY76			
Traditional male job	85.3	2.8	11.9
Traditional female job	48.2	28.8	23.0
Mixed job	48.1	7.3	44.6
FY77			
Traditional male job	84.5	3.4	12.1
Traditional female job	34.5	42.6	23.0
Mixed job	55.4	8.4	36.2
FY78			
Traditional male job	82.3	5.9	11.7
Traditional female job	36.4	39.9	23.8
Mixed job	55.3	8.5	36.2

For adult females whose last pre-CETA job was a mixed or traditionally male occupation, CETA did not place a large proportion in either mixed or traditionally male occupations. Depending on fiscal year, for females who had traditional male pre-CETA jobs, CETA retained a third to 44 percent in the same occupational type, placing from 40 percent to 46 percent in traditional female occupations. For females who had pre-CETA mixed jobs, CETA retained 44-51 percent in the same occupational type, placing from 42 percent to 47 percent in traditional female occupations.

Over time increasing proportions of those with traditionally female pre-CETA jobs entered mixed and traditionally male CETA jobs, the two categories picking up about equal shares of the additional movers. The traditional male category lost smaller proportions over time; the mixed category lost larger proportions, with more of the additional losses going into traditionally female than into traditionally male CETA jobs.

Adult males had patterns similar to those of their female counterparts, but their redistributions among categories differed somewhat from the female redistributions. A traditional male pre-CETA job had more holding power for males than a traditional female pre-CETA job had for females; only between 15 percent and 20 percent of the males in any given fiscal year shifted out of this category. Males shifted out of traditional female and mixed pre-CETA jobs at higher rates than females shifted out of traditional male or mixed pre-CETA jobs, the male rates ranging from about 55 percent to 70 percent in any given year.

In sum, for those who had pre-CETA occupations traditional for their sex, CETA changed the occupational type for proportionately more females than males. For those with pre-CETA mixed occupations or occupations nontraditional for their sex, CETA usually retained more females than males in CETA occupations of the same type. However, CETA did not shift three-quarters of those females with traditionally female pre-CETA occupations into mixed or traditional male occupations. They did not retain even half of those women in pre-CETA mixed or traditional male occupations in occupations of the same type and placed most of the changers in traditional female occupations, not mixed or traditional male occupations. How we interpret these data depends on factors that we now address.

CETA'S RECORD IN RELATION TO OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES

CETA's ability to desegregate occupations is constrained by enrollees' occupational preferences and by the structure of the labor market in which CETA has to place enrollees. The CLMS data are not adequate for assessing women's preferences or CETA's efforts to inform enrollees about the implications of alternative occupational choices. The CLMS asks respondents if they had a particular kind of job or job training in mind when they visited the manpower office, and, if so, what the occupation was.[6] We do not know if individuals with such preferences communicated these to CETA personnel, although it seems appropriate to hold CETA accountable for eliciting enrollee occupational preferences. The CLMS has no data on whether CETA personnel discussed tradeoffs among different occupations with enrollees. Thus, we also do not know if CETA exposed enrollees without previous preferences or with traditional preferences to nontraditional and mixed options. We therefore cannot know if those without preferences or with traditional preferences at CETA entry who end up in traditional jobs or training reflect (1) CETA's failure to try to shift women to nontraditional or mixed occupations or (2) the constraints of enrollees' informed preferences.

Although CETA regulations mandate occupational desegregation, CETA's ultimate objective is to train or employ enrollees in higher-

^[6] The CLMS questions ask: "Did you want a certain kind of (job/job training) when you visited the manpower office?" [IF YES]: "What was the (job/job training) that you wanted?"

paying jobs, regardless of their traditionality. Women who had traditionally male or mixed occupational preferences at CETA entry and who ended up in traditionally female occupations may be ending up in CETA occupations that pay more than their preferred occupations. We did not assess this possibility, but the CLMS file could be used to compare the average wage rate of an enrollee's preferred occupation with that of the CETA occupation in which he or she was trained or employed.

In each fiscal year more than half of the adult female respondents had occupational preferences at the time of CETA entry.[7] Table 15 shows these preferences. For those who expressed preferences, an increasing proportion wanted traditional male jobs across time (5 percent to 10 percent). However, the total percent is still small. The majority--but a declining majority (from 69 percent in FY76 to 55

Table 15

DISTRIBUTION OF TRADITIONALITY OF DESIRED CETA JOBS
FOR ADULT FEMALES

(Percent)

	Desi	red CETA Job	
Year	Traditional Male Job	Traditional Female Job	Mixed Job
FY76	5.4	68.8	25.9
FY77	10.3	53.2	36.5
FY78	10.3	55.1	34.7

^[7] The percentages were 65 percent, 57 percent, and 59 percent for FY76, FY77, and FY78, respectively.

percent in FY78)--wanted traditional female jobs. An increasing proportion (from 26 percent to 35 percent) wanted mixed jobs.

Table 16 shows the proportion of adult female and male CETA jobholders who got the occupation that they wanted. Both females and males who wanted an occupation traditional for their sex were much more apt to get it--from 74 percent to 89 percent, depending on fiscal year and sex. However, females who wanted traditional female jobs got them at lower rates than males who wanted traditional male jobs. In other words, for adults who wanted occupations traditional for their sex, CETA shifted more women than men out of jobs commensurate with those traditional preferences.

Table 16

ADULTS WHO GOT DESIRED OCCUPATION

(Percent)

		aditio Male Jo			aditic male J		Mi	xed Jo	ob
Sex/Race	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Female	56.9	33.3	43.8	86.8	75.2	73.8	60.1	43.3	43.6
White	63.6	35.6	48.5	89.4	74.0	69.9	68.6	49.8	43.3
Black	35.6	26.5	41.4	80.8	73.9	79.4	46.2	34.8	44.2
Hispanic	47.5	9.3	18.9	88.9	83.5	81.7	50.4	11.6	40.9
Other	100.0	67.4	48.2	78.5	82.2	83.6	40.5	24.5	49.1
Male	89.2	84.5	82.3	55.5	42.5	39.9	68.8	36.3	36.2
White	90.3	85.4	83.5	60.7	46.0	42.3	72.0	36.5	37.3
Black	87.2	84.0	81.5	34.8	26.2	21.8	60.9	31.8	33.5
Hispanic	81.5	76.2	80.1	81.4	30.8	68.8	55.1	53.6	35.1
Other	100.0	88.1	71.3	57.6	51.7	57.8	79.6	32.7	37.2

Table 16 also shows that substantial proportions of women who wanted traditional male or mixed occupations did not get them, especially in FY77 and FY78. For females who wanted a traditionally male occupation, only 33 percent to 57 percent got what they wanted, depending on fiscal year. For females who wanted mixed jobs, 43 percent to 60 percent got them. For all three occupational types, both females and males got what they wanted at declining rates across time.

Table 17 shows the CETA occupational distribution of adult females relative to their preferences at CETA entry. Females who wanted and did not get traditional male jobs were more likely--and increasingly more

Table 17

DISTRIBUTION OF DESIRED AND OBTAINED CETA JOB OCCUPATION FOR ADULT FEMALES

(Percent)

	Occup	ation of CETA	Job
Year and Desired Job	Traditional Male Job	Traditional Female Job	Mixed Job
FY76			
Traditional male job	56.9	26.2	16.9
Traditional female job	1.5	86.8	11.6
Mixed job	5.6	34.2	60.1
FY77			
Traditional male job	33.3	45.9	20.9
Traditional female job	8.8	75.2	16.0
Mixed job	11.9	44.8	43.3
FY78			
Traditional male job	43.8	39.8	16.4
Traditional female job	7.4	73.8	18.8
Mixed job	9.9	46.5	43.6

likely across time--to get traditional female than mixed jobs.

Depending on the fiscal year, 61 percent to 71 percent of the females who wanted and failed to get traditional male jobs ended up in traditional female jobs. Similarly, females who wanted and did not get mixed jobs were more likely--and increasingly more likely across time--to get traditional female than traditional male jobs. Of this group 79 percent to 86 percent ended up in traditional female jobs. For those who wanted and failed to get traditional female jobs, a larger proportion always got mixed than traditional male jobs. However, as declining numbers who wanted traditional female jobs got them, both the mixed and traditional male categories picked up some of the "exits" from the traditional female category.

For adult women who stated that they had had occupational preferences at the time of CETA entry, the CETA desegregation record for mixed and traditional male occupations is poor.

The young generally adopt culturally nontraditional beliefs and behaviors more readily than their elders. If this occurs for nontraditional occupational choices,[8] CETA should be less constrained by female youth than by female adult occupational preferences. CETA should then show a better occupational desegregation record for female youth than for female adults.

Table 18 shows the occupational preferences for those female youths

^[8] During adolescence both males and females are concerned with forming sex identities. If nontraditional occupational choices interfere with this process, adolescent females might be less attracted to these occupations than older women or than their younger age might suggest.

Table 18

DISTRIBUTION OF TRADITIONALITY OF DESIRED CETA JOBS
FOR FEMALE YOUTH

(Percent)

	De	sired CETA Jo	b
Year	Traditional Male Job	Traditional Female Job	Mixed Job
FY76	4.0	81.7	14.3
FY77	10.6	62.8	26.6
FY78	15.2	60.4	24.4

who had preferences at CETA entry. [9] By FY78 those who had preferences preferred traditional female occupations in about the same proportions as female adults. More female youth than female adults wanted traditionally male occupations, and fewer wanted mixed occupations.

Table 19 shows the youth distribution among CETA job types by fiscal year for all female youths, not just for those who expressed preferences. It reveals a somewhat better occupational desegregation record for female youths than for adult females, especially in traditionally male occupations. Female youths showed an increasing proportion in traditional male jobs (13 percent to 20 percent in three years); a decreasing proportion in traditional female jobs (67 percent to 57 percent in three fiscal years); and a small increase in mixed jobs (20 percent to 23 percent).

^[9] Smaller proportions of female youths had occupational preferences at CETA entry than adult females. However, at least half of the female youth respondents had preferences in each fiscal year.

Table 19

YOUTH DISTRIBUTION AMONG TRADITIONAL MALE,
TRADITIONAL FEMALE, AND MIXED CETA JOBS

(Percent)

		aditio ale Jo			aditic male J		Mi	xed Jo	b
Sex/Race	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Female	13.0	16.6	20.1	67.1	60.9	57.1	19.9	22.5	22.8
White	18.6	23.2	24.0	59.9	57.8	57.2	21.5	19.0	18.7
Black	7.7	11.6	18.6	73.7	63.6	55.5	18.6	24.8	25.9
Hispanic	14.8	15.4	11.0	76.1	62.3	64.7	9.1	22.3	24.3
Other	11.3	13.9	25.1	41.2	53.0	55.3	47.5	33.1	19.6
Male	71.4	70.4	71.1	6.9	9.9	9.5	21.7	19.7	19.4
White	81.7	83.5	81.3	3.4	4.1	2.9	14.9	12.4	15.8
Black	65.4	58.1	62.4	8.9	15.4	14.2	25.7	26.4	23.4
Hispanic	52.7	60 [°] .7	61.3	12.9	13.8	20.8	34.4	25.5	17.9
Other	62.0	58.2	64.6	13.6	14.1	11.0	24.4	27.7	24.4

If female youths have less constrained occupational preferences than female adults, the youth data suggest that CETA's poorer record for female adults is in part a function of more constrained adult preferences.

As Table 13 showed, CETA moved only small proportions of those with pre-CETA traditional occupations into traditional male or mixed occupations and retained less than half of those with pre-CETA traditional male or mixed occupations in those occupational types. How we interpret this record depends on the relationships between previous occupation and occupational preference at CETA entry.

Although the CLMS allows a cross-tabulation of these two variables, this analysis is not available to us. In its absence we can note that the military finds that women in nontraditional occupations have higher attrition than ones in traditionally female occupations. If this greater attrition represents a negative response to nontraditional occupations, CETA's record with regard to entrants with nontraditional occupational histories may in part reflect these entrants' preferences for a traditional occupation as the result of experiences with nontraditional ones.

CONCLUSION

Although we need more information to assess CETA's occupational desegregation efforts, CETA's sex desegregation record, especially for women with traditional male or mixed occupational preferences at CETA entry, strongly indicates that CETA could desegregate occupations by sex more than it has done.

Ultimately, how policymakers judge CETA's desegregation record-what action they might want to take--depends on our theories about what
occupational desegregation will produce in the short run and long
term.[10] For occupational desegregation to affect female poverty,

^[10] We had expected to assess whether different in-CETA occupational types affected women's post-CETA outcomes. However, cross-tabulations of in-CETA occupational type by three-month post-CETA outcome (employed, in school/training, unemployed, not in the labor force) showed seriously dwindling cell sizes across fiscal years. To enter a three-month post-CETA analysis, a CLMS respondent had to have both left CETA and been reinterviewed at least three months after leaving CETA. As a result, the FY77 and FY78 data could not be used. We can note that for FY76 CETA entrants in-CETA occupation affected three-month post-CETA employment and unemployment, but not school enrollment or being out of the labor force. In-CETA mixed occupations increased employment and decreased unemployment the most. Traditional

occupation, not gender, has to account for the correlation between traditionally female occupations and female poverty. Some female occupations have upward mobility opportunities. For example, elementary and secondary school teachers could become principals and other school administrators, but males disproportionately occupy the top of this career ladder. In these cases gender, not occupation, accounts for differential upward mobility.

In our society males traditionally have higher status than females, and societies always allocate larger rewards to higher status individuals. In the workplace these take the form of promotions, higher wages, etc. Until these allocative rules change, we cannot be sure that changing the occupational distributions of men and women will redistribute the rewards between the sexes. In conjunction with occupational desegregation efforts policymakers need to monitor what happens to women trained for and employed in less traditional occupations.[11] In the short run women trained in these occupations

male occupations increased employment and decreased unemployment the least. Traditional female occupations had employment and unemployment effects intermediate between these two types. Even FY76 cell sizes precluded a multivariate analysis to determine if pre-CETA characteristics associated with in-CETA occupational type, not the occupational type itself, produced these results.

^[11] For example, one study reported that young women in the National Longitudinal Survey who were employed in 1972 in traditionally male occupations did not necessarily have a wage advantage. Typicality of occupation rarely had statistically significant effects on wages. If the coefficients were taken at face value, traditionally male occupations added a small wage increment for women with 10 or 11 years of school, and no increment for high school graduates. They produced a small wage decrement for women with some college. John T. Grasso and John R. Shea, Vocational Education and Training: Impact on Youth, Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, Pittsburgh, 1979, pp. 103-104. Another study showed that women add occupational status (and presumably wages) by moving from jobs in the female sector to ones in the male sector. We need to do more studies like these to

may encounter employment barriers, thus incurring costs from occupational desegregation. In the longer run wage structures and promotion opportunities differentiated by sex may emerge in traditionally male occupations entered by women. The cultural agreement that men have higher status than women will die hard. Social groups, including the women in them, are ingenious at finding ways to preserve such agreements and the differential rewards associated with them.

track the effects for women of occupational desegration. Wendy C. Wolf and Rachel Rosenfeld, "Sex Structure of Occupations and Job Mobility," Social Forces, Vol. 56, No. 3, March 1978, pp. 823-844.

VI. IN-CETA WAGES

In general, the adult wage data for CETA OJT and job activities show the usual wage differences by sex that we observe outside of CETA.

The male wage advantage varied by CETA activity, being greatest for OJT, less for PSE, and least for AWE. For OJT the majority of the wage differences by sex fell between 60 and 80 cents per hour; for PSE, between 30 and 60 cents; and for AWE, between 20 and 50 cents.

For adults in CETA jobs the male wage advantage varied by the Census occupational category. The higher the status of the occupation, the smaller the average hourly wage difference by sex. For all three fiscal years the professional and managerial categories showed very small differences; in FY76 and FY77 adult females in professional jobs earned a few cents more per hour than their male counterparts. Adult males had systematically higher hourly wages than adult females for all three fiscal years in the sales, clerical, crafts, nontransport operative, transport operative, nonfarm labor, and service categories. Except for occasional reversals, these differences occurred for all four race/ethnic groups (whites, blacks, hispanics, and other).

Table 20 shows the average hourly wage for CETA OJT by traditionality of the occupation. Even when we control on type of occupation, males continue to have higher wages than females. In general, adult females got less pay for training in traditional female occupations than for training in the other two occupational types. However, with one exception, males got the highest pay for training in

Table 20

AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATE OF CETA JOB TRAINING FOR ADULTS
BY TRADITIONALITY OF JOB

(In dollars)

		aditio ale Jo			aditic male J		Mi	xed Jo	ър
Sex/Race	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Female	2.82	3.23	3.48	2.78	2.96	3.25	2.95	2.93	3.37
White	2.64	3.33	3.60	2.73	2.96	3.18	2.92	2.93	3.37
Black	3.40	3.04	3.04	2.86	2.83	3.18	2.86	2.85	3.64
Hispanic	2.74	(a)	3.37	2.83	3.20	3.41	3.10	3.05	3.13
Other	(a)	(a)	2.57	3.03	2.90	3.33	2.89	3.10	3.36
Male	3.65	3.83	4.16	3.75	3.23	4.25	3.34	3.51	3.80
White	3.67	3.86	4.18	3.64	3.68	4.27	3.38	3.64	3.77
Black	3.57	3.90	4.09	3.43	3.11	4.35	3.25	3.38	3.61
Hispanic	3.58	3.59	3.98	4.00	2.97	(a)	3.25	3.04	3.93
Other	3.69	3.90	4.02	4.28	2.97	3.95	3.27	2.99	4.51

^aNo data available.

traditional female jobs.[1] With that one exception, the OJT wage differences by sex are therefore greatest in the traditional female occupations. They are less in the traditional male occupations, and least in the mixed jobs.

Table 21 shows the average hourly wage for CETA jobs by sex, race, and traditionality of the occupation. When we compare male and female wages by traditionality of the occupation, males again show higher wages

^[1] Males in training for traditional female occupations had a wage advantage over their female counterparts of 97 cents in FY76 and \$1.00 in FY78. The difference for FY77 is only 27 cents. White males usually have the highest wage of the four racial/ethnic groups and usually constitute a large proportion of the total males in any category. For some reason FY77 had a small proportion of white males in training in traditional female occupations.

Table 21

AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATE OF CETA JOBS FOR ADULTS
BY TRADITIONALITY OF JOBS

(In dollars)

		aditio ale Jo			aditic male J		Mi	xed Jo	b
Sex/Race	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Female	3.22	3.29	3.54	2.83	3.11	3.32	3.36	3.53	3.83
White	3.32	3.42	3.62	2.90	3.19	3.32	3.32	3.57	3.94
Black	3.20	3.04	3.43	2.64	3.01	3.50	3.39	3.38	3.54
Hispanic	3.57	3.89	3.36	2.74	2.99	3.19	3.49	3.44	4.02
Other	2.65	3.79	3.37	3.03	2.93	3.46	3.62	3.99	3.93
Male	3.35	3.57	3.78	3.38	3.57	3.78	3.48	3.81	4.01
White	3.46	3.69	3.85	3.46	3.59	3.90	3.58	3.89	4.06
Black	3.09	3.30	3.56	3.24	3.55	3.64	3.28	3.60	3.86
Hispanic	3.10	3.34	3.91	2.96	3.45	3.48	3.14	3.74	4.02
Other	3.17	3.55	3.98	3.35	3.63	3.76	3.85	3.88	4.03

than females for all fiscal years and all three occupational types. The wage differences between the sexes were greatest in the traditional female occupations, less and about equal in the traditional male and mixed occupations.

We cannot conclude from these data that CETA pays inequitable wages by sex. Pre-CETA characteristics affect in-CETA wages as they affect wages in any job--e.g., age, education, labor force experience. We requested multivariate analyses that would have allowed us to compare wages by sex, net of relevant pre-CETA characteristics for which we had measures. DOL ran into programming problems for these runs that could not be resolved within the time frame of the project.

We do have data on wages by educational status and CETA activity (OJT, adult work experience, and PSE). These appear in Tables 22-25. In these 45 female/male wage comparisons for FY76-78, only four show higher wages for females than for males. Three of these four cases are in the "still in high school" category, a cell that has very small numbers for the adult analyses and for which the data are less reliable.

The large wage differences by sex in OJT should be of particular policy concern. If an individual is in OJT, presumably he or she does not have prior experience in the occupation. And yet, even when we control on educational attainment, OJT had the largest wage differences by sex of all three CETA activities.

Table 22

AVFRAGE HOURLY WAGE RATE FOR ADULTS IN OJT BY EDUCATIONAL STATUS

(In dollars)

		Edu	Educational Status	ST	
Year/	Still in	High School	High School		Beyond High
Sex/Race	High School ^a	Dropout	Graduate	School, in School	School, out of School
FY 76					
Female	2,43	2.64	2.83	3,56	3.10
White	3.57	2.47	2.80	3.94	3.15
Black	(P)	2.80	2.84	4.13	2.95
Hispanic	1.27	3.01	2.99	2.31	3.33
Other	(p)	(p)	2.79	3,43	(q)
Male	3.72	3.27	3.60	3.96	3,86
White	95.5	3.22	3.59	4.00	3.94
Black	5.23	3.23	3,63	4.19	3.44
Hispanic	(a)	3.38	3.56	2,53	3.81
Other	(Q)	3.53	3,68	3.50	3.72
FY 77					
Female	2.38	2,91	2.94	2.88	3.18
White	2.30	2.81	2.96	2.90	3.28
Black	2.44	3.17	2.73	2.43	2.88
Hispanic	(P)	2.84	3.43	3.47	2.94
Other	(p)	2.99	3.40	(q)	3.13
Male	2.73	3.51	3.76	3,62	3.89
White	2.45	3,58	3.75	3,81	4.08
Black	(b)	3.58	3.94	3.21	3.51
Hispanic	3.13	3.33	3.53	3,49	3.22
Other	(þ)	3.11	3.89	2.53	3.46
FY 78					
Fema1e	2,46	3.07	3,25	3.66	3.76
White	(q)	3.04	3.26	3.71	3.62
Black	2.46	3.07	3.18	3,54	4.63
Hispanic	(<u>a</u>)	3,02	3.52	3.00	2.96
Other	(þ)	3,39	2.73	(p)	3.38
Male	3.85	3.85	4.02	4.02	4.40
White	3.50	3.81	4.06	3.99	4.51
Black	(b)	4.02	3.81	5.45	4.07
Hispanic	4.00	3.86	3.97	2.85	4.16
Other	(P)	3.65	4.72	4.17	4.02
The cell sizes of this category are usually small.	ategory are usually	small.			

The cell sizes or the bound of the bound of

Table 23

AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATE FOR ADULTS IN AWE,

BY EDUCATIONAL STATUS

(In dollars)

		103	Educational Status	1	
Sex/Race	Still in · High School	High School Dropout	High School Graduate	Beyond High School, in School	Beyond High School, out of School
FY76					
Female	2.64	2.43	2.55	2.79	2.92
White	2.78	2.41	2.59	2.96	2.96
Black	2.52	2,39	2,43	2,62	2.80
Hispanic	2.10	2.53	2.46	3.17	2.66
Other	2.50	2,69	2.56	2,75	3.17
Ma 1	2.67	2.70	3.14	3.20	3,23
White	000 6	2 71	3 20	57 8	3.26
Rlock	2 60	2 65	0 80	00 6	2 61
Diach	00.7	27.6	20.0	2.20	7.30
Other	(a)	2.80	3.01	2.33	2.96
FV77					
Female	2.52	2.45	2.64	3,11	2.86
White	2.46	2.44	2.61	3,03	2.83
Black	2,30	2,42	2.62	(a)	2.92
Hispanic	2.30	2.40	2.90	2.40	3,03
Other	3.51	3,13	2.75	4.46	2.74
Male	2.30	2.81	3.13	3,31	3,22
White	2.30	2.81	3.14	3.08	3,23
Black	(a)	2.68	3.01	3,65	3,19
Hispanic	(a)	2.89	3.39	3.23	3.21
Other	(a)	2.98	3.01	2.83	3.19
FY78					
Female	2.28	2.74	2.85	3.07	3.02
White	(a)	2.74	2.81	2.97	3.06
Black	2.13	2.72	2.92	3,12	2.99
Hispanic	2.43	2.80	2.84	3.48	2.78
Other	(a)	2.75	3.00	(a)	2.95
Male	2.48	2.97	3.31	3.15	3.24
White	2.48	2.89	3,34	3.28	3,34
Black	(a)	2.94	3.29	2.53	3.26
Hispanic	(a)	3.23	3.47	3.00	2.88
Other	(a)	3.14	2,71	(a)	2.61

^aNo data available.

Table 24

AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATE FOR ADULTS IN PSE, BY EDUCATIONAL STATUS (In dollars)

11 High School Beyoute School Graduate School 2.96 3.2.87 3.16 2.87 3.16 2.87 3.2.1 3.2.1 3.2.1 3.2.1 3.2.1 3.2.1 3.2.1 3.2.1 3.2.1 3.3.2 3.8.2 3.3.3 3.3 3.	Strill in High School Strill in High School High School Dropout		
FY 76 White 3.14 2.96 2.99 3 White (a) 2.59 2.87 3.14 Black (a) 2.89 2.87 3.16 White 3.01 3.18 3.50 3.18 White 2.62 2.99 3.17 3.18 Black 2.14 3.25 3.18 3.21 White (a) 3.64 3.39 3.78 White (a) 3.64 3.39 3.78 White (a) 3.69 3.18 FY 77 White (a) 3.69 3.19 FW 78 Female (a) 3.64 3.39 White (a) 3.64 3.48 White (a) 3.69 3.16 White (a) 3.69 3.16 White (a) 3.69 3.18 FW 78 Female (a) 3.69 3.19 White (a) 3.69 3.10 White (a) 3.68 3.16 White (a) 3.68 3.16 White (a) 3.68 3.16 White (a) 3.48 3.84 White (a) 3.43 3.44 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White (a) 3.72 White (a) 3.73 White	FY 76 Female White White S.14 S.29 S.284 S.259 S.259 S.259 S.283 S.293 S.293 S.293 S.293 S.294 S.295 S.295 S.295 S.295 S.295 S.296 S.2		School, Out of School
Pemale 2.99 2.84 2.99 3 White 3.14 2.96 2.96 3	Pemale 2.99 2.84 2 White 3.14 2.96 2.86 Black (a) 2.59 2.83 2.50 Cther 2.50 3.41 3.01 White 3.01 3.18 3.01 Black 2.62 2.99 3.00 Black 2.54 2.99 3.00 White (a) 3.03 3.03 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.68 3.68 White (a) 3.64 3.39 White 3.69 3.10 White (a) 3.48 White (a) 3.64 3.39 White (a) 3.48 White (a) 3.43 White (a) 3.45 White (a) 3.43 White (a) 3.44 White (a) 3.45 White (a) 3.44 Whi		
White 3.14 2.96 2.96 2.87 Black (a) 2.59 2.87 2.87 2.89 3.41 3.16 2.89 3.41 3.16 2.89 3.41 3.16 2.89 3.16 2.89 3.16 3.16 3.16 3.17 3.18 3.17 3.18	White 3.14 2.96 2 Black (a) 2.59 2 Hispanic (a) 2.68 3.15 3 White 2.68 3.15 3 Black 2.14 3.25 3 Uther (a) 3.03 Black (a) 3.03 Black (b) 2.50 3.20 White 2.50 3.20 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.68 3.06 White (a) 3.43 3.45 White (a) 3.43 3.45 White (a) 3.43 3.45 White 3.43 3.45	3.35	3.53
Black	##spanic (a) 2.59 2.83 ##spanic (a) 2.83 2.83 Other 2.50 3.41 3.41 ##spanic 2.68 3.15 3.83 White 3.01 3.18 3.63 ##spanic 2.14 3.25 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.66 3.48 ##spanic (a) 3.68 ##spanic (a) 3.10 White 3.68 ##spanic (a) 3.10 ##spanic (a) 3.16 ##spanic (a) 3.43 ##spanic (a) 3.16 ##spanic (a) 3.43 ##spanic (a) 3.45 ##spanic (a) 3.43 ##spanic (a) 3.45 ##spanic (a) 3.45 ##spanic (a) 3.45 ##spanic (a) 3.43 ##spanic (a) 3.45 ##spanic (a) 3.43 ##s	3,35	3,56
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Male 2.68 3.15 3.50 3 White 3.01 3.18 3.57 3 Black 2.62 2.99 3.27 3 Hispanic 2.14 3.25 3.17 3 White (a) 2.54 2.90 3.19 White 2.55 2.73 3.18 Hispanic 2.50 3.20 3.18 White 3.60 3.28 3.87 White 3.60 3.48 3.87 Hispanic 4.13 3.22 3.52 Hispanic 4.13 3.22 3.52 Hispanic 4.13 3.48 3.87 White 3.59 3.22 3.52 White 3.68 3.06 3.30 White 3.90 3.10 3.44 Hispanic 2.77 3.25 3.49 White 3.43 3.45 3.49 White 3.30 3.16 3.49 </td <td>Male 2.68 3.15 3 White 3.01 3.18 3 Black 2.62 2.99 3 Uther (a) 3.25 3 White (b) 3.64 3.39 White (a) 3.64 3.39 White (b) 3.69 3.48 Female 3.60 3.48 Black (a) 3.68 White (a) 3.16 White (a) 3.16 White (a) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (c) 3.77 White (c) 3.77 White (c) 3.77 White (c) 3.77 White (c) 3.74 White (c) 3.75 Whi</td> <td>2.67</td> <td>3.62</td>	Male 2.68 3.15 3 White 3.01 3.18 3 Black 2.62 2.99 3 Uther (a) 3.25 3 White (b) 3.64 3.39 White (a) 3.64 3.39 White (b) 3.69 3.48 Female 3.60 3.48 Black (a) 3.68 White (a) 3.16 White (a) 3.16 White (a) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 White (c) 3.77 White (c) 3.77 White (c) 3.77 White (c) 3.77 White (c) 3.74 White (c) 3.75 Whi	2.67	3.62
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Black 2.62 2.99 3.27 3.50 Ilispanic 2.14 3.25 3.17 3.50 Other (a) 3.63 3.59 3.19 White (a) 3.03 3.18 Hispanic 2.56 3.20 3.07 White 3.64 3.39 3.78 Hispanic 4.13 3.48 3.87 Hispanic (a) 3.64 3.39 3.78 White 3.69 3.22 3.55 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.68 3.05 White 3.68 3.68 3.05 White 3.49 3.44 Hispanic (a) 3.10 3.44 Hispanic (a) 3.45 3.45 White 3.43 3.45 3.45 White 3.43 3.45 3.82 White 3.43 3.45 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.75 3.72 White 3.43 3.45 3.72 Hispanic (a) 3.72 3.72 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Hispanic (a) 3.72 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Hispanic (a) 3.72 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Hispan	Black 2.62 2.99 3 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.20 3.	3.86	3.93
Hispanic	Hispanic	3.83	3.91
FY 77 Female 2.54 2.90 3.19 White, (a) 3.03 3.21 White (a) 2.55 2.73 3.18 Black 2.55 2.73 3.18 Black 2.55 2.73 3.18 White 3.64 3.39 3.78 White (a) 3.59 3.22 Fy 78 Female 3.68 3.06 3.31 White (a) 3.10 3.30 Black (a) 3.16 White (a) 3.43 3.45 White (a) 3.68 Black (a) 3.68 White (a) 3.43 3.45 White (a) 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Black (a) 3.68 White (a) 3.43 3.45 Black (a) 3.68 White (a) 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Black (a)	FY 77 Female 2.54 2.90 White, (a) 3.03 Black 2.55 Hispanic (a) 2.73 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.69 3.48 Black 4.13 3.31 Other (a) 3.68 Female 3.90 3.10 Black (a) 3.16 White (a) 3.43 White 3.45 White 3.45 Wale 3.45 Wale 3.74 White 3.77 White 3.77 White 3.77 White 3.77 White 3.77 White 3.77 White 3.74 White 3.74 White 3.74 White 3.74 White 3.75 White 3.74	3.75	3.57
FY 77 Female 2.54 2.90 3.19 White 2.55 2.73 3.18 Hispanic 2.50 3.20 Other (a) 2.87 3.39 White 3.60 3.48 3.87 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.68 White 3.90 3.10 Slack (a) 3.45 White (a) 3.45 White 3.44 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.46 White (a) 3.45 White (b) 3.45 3.45 Whi	FY 77 White, (a) 3.03 White, (b) 3.03 White 2.55 Hispanic (a) 2.87 White 3.60 Female 3.60 Fremale 3.68 White (a) 3.10 White 3.48 White 3.45 White 3.45 White 3.45 White 3.45 White 3.45 White 3.74	3.88	4.02
Female 2.54 2.90 3.19 White (a) 3.03 3.21 Black 2.55 2.73 3.18 Hispanic 2.50 3.20 3.07 Male 3.64 3.39 3.78 White 3.64 3.39 3.87 Black 4.13 3.22 3.55 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.31 Female 3.90 3.16 3.44 Hispanic (a) 3.16 3.44 Hispanic (a) 3.16 3.45 Mhite 3.45 3.25 3.49 Mhite 3.77 3.25 3.49 Mhite 3.77 3.25 3.49 Mhite 3.74 3.51 3.49 Mhite 3.74 3.25 3.49 Mhite 3.74 3.51 3.82 Mhite 3.74 3.51 3.78 White 3.74 3.51 3.7	Female 2.54 2.90 White, (a) 3.03 Black 2.55 2.73 Hispanic (a) 2.87 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.69 3.48 Female 3.59 3.22 Hispanic (a) 3.68 White 3.90 3.16 Hispanic (a) 3.16 White 3.43 3.45 White 3.77 3.25 White 3.45 White 3.45 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.77 3.25 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.77 3.25 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.74 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.74 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.74 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.77		
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# Black 2.55 2.73 3.18 # Hispanic 2.50 3.20 3.07 Other (a) 2.50 3.20 3.07 White 3.64 3.39 3.72 Black 4.13 3.31 3.55 White 3.69 3.32 3.55 Other (a) 3.68 3.31 3.55 White 3.90 3.10 3.30 Black (a) 3.10 3.44 Hispanic (a) 3.10 3.44 Male 3.43 3.45 3.82 White 3.74 3.51 3.82 White 3.74 3.51 3.84 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.72 ### Black (a) 3.68 3.72	#Hispanic 2.55 2.73 #Hispanic 2.50 3.20 Other (a) 2.87 White 3.64 3.39 White 3.60 3.48 #Hispanic (a) 3.68 Fremale 3.90 3.10 #Hispanic (a) 3.16 #Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.43 3.45 White 3.77 3.25 #Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.77 3.25 #Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.77 3.25 #Hispanic (a) 3.45	4.14	3.92
Hispanic 2.50 3.20 3.07 Other (a) 2.87 3.35 White 3.64 3.39 3.78 White 3.60 3.48 3.87 Hispanic (a) 3.55 Other (a) 3.68 3.31 Female 3.90 3.10 3.30 Black (a) 3.16 3.44 Hispanic (a) 2.87 3.82 White 3.74 3.25 Male 3.43 3.45 3.88 White 3.74 3.51 3.88 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.78	Hispanic 2.50 3.20 Other (a) 2.87 Male 3.64 3.39 White 3.60 3.48 Black 4.13 3.31 Other (a) 3.68 Female 3.68 3.06 White 3.90 3.10 Black (a) 3.16 Hispanic (a) 2.87 Other 2.77 3.25 White 3.43 3.45 White 3.74 3.51 Black (a) 3.45 White 3.77 3.25 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.74 3.51 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.74 3.51	3.86	3.87
Male 3.64 3.39 3.78 White 3.60 3.48 3.87 Black 3.59 3.22 3.52 Hispanic 4.13 3.48 3.55 Other (a) 3.68 3.68 3.83 White 3.90 3.10 3.30 Black (a) 3.16 3.44 Hispanic (a) 3.45 3.82 White 3.43 3.45 3.84 Hispanic (a) 3.74 3.78 Male 3.74 3.51 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Male 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Male 3.78 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.45 3.84 Hispanic (a) 3.68 3.78	Male 3.64 3.39 White 3.60 3.48 Black 4.13 3.22 Hispanic (a) 3.68 Female 3.68 3.06 White 3.90 3.10 Black (a) 3.16 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.77 3.25 White 3.77 3.25 Hispanic (a) 3.45 White 3.74 3.51 Black (a) 3.45 White 3.74 3.25	3,55	3.64
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hite 3.64 3.75 3.77 3.87 1.72 3.52 1.72 3.52 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.7	hite 3.60 3.48 lack 4.13 3.22 lispanic 4.13 3.31 lither (a) 3.68 3.06 little (a) 3.16 lispanic (a) 2.87 lite 3.43 3.45 lite 3.43 3.45 lite 3.74 3.51	60 7	70.4
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trher (a) 3.51 3.53 trher (a) 3.68 3.68 3.83 male 3.68 3.06 3.31 Mitte 3.90 3.10 3.30 tispanic (a) 2.87 3.65 te 3.43 3.45 3.49 thite 3.74 3.51 3.84 tispanic (a) 3.68 3.72 tispanic (a) 3.68 3.72	1.5 panic	0.00 85	7
Inter (a) 3.68 5.83 Inter (a) 3.16 3.30 Inter (a) 3.16 3.44 Itspanic (a) 2.77 3.25 Ite (a) 3.43 3.45 Ite (a) 3.74 Ite (a) 3.51 Ite (a) 3.68 Ite (a) 3.68 Ite (a) 3.68 Ite (b) 3.68 Ite (a) 3.68 Ite (b) 3.68 Ite (b) 3.68 Ite (c) 3.68 Ite (d) 3.68	### 1.56 #### 1.56 ### 1.56 ### 1.56 ### 1.56 ### 1.56 ### 1.56 ### 1.56 ### 1.56 ### 1.56 ### 1.56 ##		70.1
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anale 3.68 3.06 3.31 Anite 3.90 3.10 3.30 Slack (a) 3.16 3.44 Itspanic (a) 2.77 3.25 3.49 Ther 2.77 3.25 3.49 The 3.43 3.45 3.82 Third 3.15 3.22 3.78 Itspanic (a) 3.68 3.72	anale 3.68 3.06 Anite 3.90 3.10 Slack (a) 3.16 Hispanic (a) 2.87 Other 2.77 3.25 He 3.43 3.45 Anite 3.74 3.51 Slack (a) 3.51 Hispanic (a) 3.45 Hispanic (a) 3.45 Hispanic (b) 3.45 Hispanic (c) 3.66		
te 3.90 3.10 3.30 ick (a) 3.16 3.44 spanic (a) 2.77 3.25 3.49 ier 2.77 3.25 3.49 ier 3.43 3.45 3.82 iek 3.15 3.22 3.78 spanic (a) 3.68 3.72	te 3.90 3.10 tck (a) 3.16 spanic (a) 2.87 ter 2.77 3.25 te 3.74 3.51 te 3.75 3.51 te 3.75 3.52	4.16	3.88
cck (a) 3.16 3.44 panic (a) 2.87 3.05 er 2.77 3.25 3.49 ter 3.43 3.45 3.82 te 3.74 3.51 3.84 cck 3.15 3.68 3.72	tek (a) 3.16 panic (a) 2.87 ter 2.77 3.25 te 3.43 3.45 te 3.74 3.51 manic (a) 3.45	4.33	3.93
panic (a) 2.87 3.05 per 2.77 3.25 3.49 3.43 3.45 3.82 te 3.74 3.51 3.84 ck 3.15 3.22 3.78 panic (a) 3.68 3.72	ppanic (a) 2.87 er 2.77 3.25 i.e. 3.43 3.45 t.e. 3.74 3.51 c.e. 3.15 3.22 manic (a) 3.63	3.75	3.74
ier 2.77 3.25 3.49 3.43 3.45 3.82 te 3.74 3.51 3.84 ck 3.15 3.22 3.78 spanic (a) 3.68 3.72	ier 2.77 3.25 3.43 3.45 te 3.74 3.51 ck 3.15 3.22	2.93	3.73
3.43 3.45 3.82 ck 3.74 3.51 3.84 ck 3.15 3.22 3.78 panic (a) 3.68 3.72	3.43 3.45 te 3.74 3.51 ck 3.15 3.22	4.21	4.02
3.43 3.45 3.82 te 3.74 3.51 3.84 lck 3.15 3.22 3.78 spanic (a) 3.68 3.72	3.43 3.45 te 3.74 3.51 3.15 3.22	0 - 7	-
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3.15 3.22 3.78 (a) 3.68 3.72	3.15 3.22	4.13	4.35
(a) 3.68 3.72	3 68	3.80	4.02
	(4)	4.43	4.21
(a) 3.65 3.79	(a) 3.65	4.87	4.57

^aNo data available.

 $^{^{\}rm b}{\rm Includes}$ only PSE sustainment for FY78.

Table 25

AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATE FOR ADULTS IN PSE NON-SUSTAINMENT BY EDUCATIONAL STATUS IN FY 78 (In dollars)

		Εdι	Educational Status	S	
	Still in	High School	High School	Beyond High	Beyond High
Sex/Race	High School	Dropout	Graduate	School, in School	School, out of
					School
Female	4.47	3.24	3.42	4.04	4.06
White	4.10	3.41	3,39	4.00	4.11
Black	4.38	3.08	3,33	4.28	3.91
Hispanic	(a)	3.29	3.78	3.65	3.97
Other	4.81	3.00	3.91	3.47	4.29
701°	70 7	ን 65	3,77	4.26	4.30
White	5.50	3,76	3,82	4.24	4.32
Black	3.82	3.40	3.68	3,99	4.18
Hispanic	4.00	3.92	3.82	3.86	4.72
0ther	3.74	3,81	3.60	5.89	4.16

a_{No} data available.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The data reported here suggest that for FY76, FY77, and FY78 CETA allocated its participation opportunities, CETA activity assignments, and wages inequitably by sex. Although they show that CETA had a somewhat better occupational desegregation record for adult females than for males, they also indicate room for improvement for both sexes.

Data on women's demand for CETA services and better data on CETA entrants' occupational preferences may strengthen or qualify our conclusions about CETA's participation opportunities and CETA's occupational desegregation record.

CETA PARTICIPATION

Relative to their eligibility, women 18-65 years of age are underrepresented in all CETA Titles for all fiscal years except Title I in

FY78. They are represented in Titles II and VI at only 60 to 75 percent
of the number eligible. If we can assume that eligible males and
females have equal demand for CETA services, females are inequitably
underrepresented in CETA. The demand data required to make this
assessment do not currently exist for CETA.

PROGRAM ASSIGNMENT WITHIN CETA

We assess the equity of activity assignment in two ways: assignment to Title and assignment to different activities within Title I.

Relative to the distribution of all adults, female adults are overrepresented in Title I, slightly underrepresented in Title II, and underrepresented in Title VI. In other words, relative to all adults, women are more apt to be assigned to training and income transfer jobs and less apt to be assigned to PSE jobs. The Title I overrepresentation of women increases with time; their Title II underrepresentation decreases with time, and the Title VI underrepresentation remains constant.

Multivariate analyses show that being female increases the chances of being assigned to Title I relative to Titles II and VI, independent of background characteristics that might be associated with sex and affect Title assignment.

Relative to the distribution of all adults within Title I, adult females are overrepresented in classroom training (basic skills and job training), underrepresented in OJT, and overrepresented in adult work experience. They are underrepresented in PSE in FY76 and FY77 and overrepresented in FY78. When we control on background characteristics other than sex that might affect Title I activity assignments, adult females are still more likely to be assigned to classroom training than to OJT and to AWE than to PSE.

Preference data show that women are at least as likely as men to get the activity that they wanted at CETA entry. However, for those who wanted job training, females are much more likely to get classroom training than OJT. For those who wanted jobs, they were more likely to get adult work experience than PSE jobs. These data suggest that, relative to men, CETA integrates women less into the workplace (gives

them classroom training rather than OJT) and less into "serious" jobs (ones intended as transitions to unsubsidized employment).

OCCUPATIONAL DESEGREGATION IN CETA

Across the three fiscal years CETA placed most adult women, although a declining proportion, in traditional female occupations.

CETA placed slightly increasing proportions of women in traditional male occupations. The proportions in mixed occupations remained stable.

CETA failed to shift three-quarters of those with pre-CETA traditional female jobs into mixed or traditional male jobs. They failed to retain even half of those with pre-CETA mixed or traditional male jobs in occupations of the same type. Those who shifted from mixed or traditional male occupations usually ended up in traditional female jobs, not in traditional male or mixed occupations.

On the face of it CETA's occupational desegregation record is not notable. However, we have to judge it partly in relation to their clients' informed occupational preferences. CETA has a poor record for women who had traditional male or mixed occupational preferences at CETA entry. Depending on the fiscal year, CETA placed from 74 to 89 percent of the women with traditional female occupational preferences in these occupations. However, for women with traditional male occupational preferences, CETA placed only 33 to 57 percent in traditional male occupations; for women with mixed occupational preferences, CETA placed only 43 to 60 percent in mixed occupations.

We do not have data that let us assess whether CETA suggested mixed or traditional male occupations to the 40 percent of their female

clients who did not have occupational preferences at CETA entry. We have not analyzed available data to determine if: (1) the much larger discontinuities between pre-CETA and in-CETA occupations for those with mixed or traditional male pre-CETA occupations reflect these women's negative experiences with less traditional occupations and demands for traditional ones; and (2) women with traditional male or mixed occupational prefences at CETA entry who CETA placed in traditional female occupations got occupations that paid much better than their preferred occupations.

IN-CETA WAGES

In general, the adult wage data for CETA, OJT, PSE, and AWE activities show the usual wage differences by sex that we observe outside of CETA. Males made higher wages than females in all CETA activities, the differences being greatest for OJT, less for PSE, and least for AWE.

Relative to Census occupational categories, average hourly wage differences by sex are least for the high status occupations. In some fiscal years females in the professional and managerial occupations made a few cents more per hour than their male counterparts. However, males had systematically higher wages than females for all other occupational categories.

The data also show that adult women get higher wages in CETA's traditional male or mixed occupations than in the traditional female occupations. CETA's mixed occupations confer the highest wages for women of all three occupational types. Males get higher wages than

females in all three occupational types, the wage differences between males and females being greatest for CETA's traditional female occupations and less and about equal for traditional male and mixed occupations.

In the absence of additional analyses, we cannot conclude that CETA pays inequitable wages by sex. For example, age, education, and labor force experience all affect wages, and we do not yet have the multivariate analyses that let us simultaneously control on several wage-relevant characteristics. However, controls on one variable, educational attainment, did not remove the sex difference in wages, even in OJT, where men and women are presumably equally inexperienced. This analysis suggests that CETA may perpetuate the wage inequities of the general society.

Appendix SUPPORTING TABLES

Table A.1

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE ELIGIBLE POPULATION FOR CETA YOUTH PROGRAMS

	Title IIIA (SYP)	Title IIIC.2 (YCCIP)	Title IIIC.3 (YETP)
Total number (000)	8,062	3,390	5,846
Sex			
Male	46	54	46
Female	54	46	54
Race/Ethnicity			
White	61	76	60
Black	28	18	29
Hispanic	9	5	9
Other	2	1	2

SOURCE: William Barnes. "Target Groups" in <u>CETA</u>: <u>An Analysis of the Issues</u>, National Commission for Manpower Policy, Special Report No. 23, May 1978, p. 99.

Table A.2

FEMALE YOUTH PARTICIPATION BY TITLE

(Percent)

Year	Title I	Title II/VI	SYP	YCCIP ^a	YETP a	Total
FY76	42.7	36.9	47.0			44.7
FY77	47.9	35.8	47.8			47.1
FY78	48.1	34.7	51.4	24.8	51.3	48.6

 $[\]ensuremath{^{\mathrm{a}}}\xspace^{\mathrm{a}}\xspace^{\mathrm{YCCIP}}$ and YETP were not authorized and funded until the end of FY77.

Table A.3

YOUTH PARTICIPATION BY TITLE

(Percent)

	,-	Title I	_	Titl	Title 11/VI	-		SYP		>	yccı P ^a		>	YETPa,b	
Sex/Race	FY76	FY76 FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Female White		33.4	23.8	4.3	4.7	1	56.0	61.9	56.1	::	1:	1.0	1:	: :	13.0
Black Hispanic Other	35.4 52.3 29.0	29.8 31.8 30.7	18.1 23.2 20.3	N N		***O	62.7	65.6	200 200 200 200	1 1 1	111	.000			0.0.2.0
Male White Black Hispanic Other	46.7 46.7 38.2 42.2 46.8	32.4 37.2 27.8 34.0	24.3 30.4 18.1 23.2 18.8	0.48.60 0.49.60	2000 2000 2000 2000		51.1 44.9 57.9 55.5 48.1	60.1 53.0 66.3 76.3	50.2 59.8 53.8 64.1	11111	!!!!!	0004m			5.11 7.11 7.11 7.9
Total	41.5	41.5 32.9	24.0	5.2	6.2	8.6	53.3	6.09	53.1	:	:	3.9		:	12,3
Ratio of female to total partici- pation		0.96 1.02	0.99	0.82	0.76	0.71	1.05	1.02	1.06	1	:	0.26		1	1.06

Arccip and YETP were not authorized and funded until the end of FY77.

bYETP includes YETP CT, YETP OJT, and YETP Other.

Table A.4
YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN TITLE I BY IPA ASSIGNMENT

(Percent)

		CT			0 J T			YWE)	Other	
Sex/Race	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Female White Black Hispanic Other	16.3 16.6 15.5 20.5	21.1 21.3 20.6 19.1 32.6	31.3 27.4 35.7 36.1 26.3	4.6 3.5 3.6	5.0 7.4 2.8 3.9	8.4 12.1 4.7 6.5	48.4 48.7 46.1 51.8 53.9	47.2 46.2 45.1 60.4 35.5	46.7 46.5 46.8 44.8 52.2	30.8 28.8 34.9 27.8 22.0	26.7 25.2 31.6 16.6 28.9	13.7 14.0 12.8 12.5
Male White Black Hispanic Other	14.6 13.7 15.9 14.8	17.4 17.2 15.4 22.1 30.6	23.8 23.4 21.3 30.6 33.6	7.4 9.0 4.0 6.9 21.4	10.0 13.2 4.7 11.7	14.3 7.5 14.2 8.5	47.1 50.5 48.8 29.1 32.9	43.9 41.0 48.7 42.8 43.6	41.8 38.7 48.3 39.5 42.1	30.9 26.8 31.3 49.2 31.6	28.7 28.6 31.2 23.4 16.7	20.2 19.8 23.0 15.7
Total	15.3	19.2	27.4	6.2	7.6	11.5	47.6	45.5	44.1	30.9	27.8	17.0
Ratio of female to total participation		41.1 1.10 1.14	1.14	η2.0	0.66	0.73	1,02	1.04	1.06	1.00	0.96	0.81

Table A.5

FEMALE YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN TITLE I BY IPA ASSIGNMENT

(Percent)

Year	CT	OJT	YWE	Other	Total
FY76	45.4	31.6	43.4	42.6	42.7
FY77	52.7	31.4	49.7	46.2	47.9
FY78	54.9	35.4	50.9	38.5	48.1

Table A.6

FY78 YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN YETP BY IPA ASSIGNMENT

(Percent)

Sex/Race	YETP CT	YETP OJT	YETP Other
Female	18.8	3.1	78.1
White	18.4	2.6	79.0
Black	21.5	3.0	75.5
Hispanic	14.0	6.2	79.8
Other	11.6	0	88.4
Male	15.9	4.4	79.7
White	14.7	4.9	80.4
Black	16.8	4.7	78.5
Hispanic	19.2	2.3	78.6
Other	10.0	2.3	87.7
Total	17.4	3.7	78.9
Ratio of female to total participation		0.84	0.99

aConsists primarily of work experience.

Table A.7

YOUTH DISTRIBUTION OF OBTAINED CETA SERVICES

WITHIN DESIRED SERVICE^a

(Percent)

		Bas	ic Ski	lls	Job	Train	ing		Job	
IPA	Sex	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Classroom	Male	37.3	55.8	71.0	35.3	42.7	43.1	9.1	8.0	8.0
training b	Female	81.4	74.1	71.8	34.8	54.6	52.5	8.6	10.5	11.6
On-the-job	Male	4.4	2.3	3.4	8.6	9.7	12.1	7.2	10.6	8.1
training ^C	Female	3.5	1.5	2.7	3.7	4.2	5.7	4.5	6.3	6.2
Youth work	Male	56.8	41.4	22.3	50.3	39.2	35.1	63.4	52.5	56.8
$_{ m experience}^{ m d}$	Female	15.1	22.6	23.4	51.9	36.2	36.6	74.4	63.2	63.6
Public service	Male	1.5	0.5	3.3	5.8	8.4	9.7	20.3	28.9	27.1
${\tt employment}^{{\tt e}}$	Female	0.0	1.8	2.1	9.5	5.0	5.2	12.4	20.0	18.7

^aOnly the participants who have expressed their desired CETA services are included in the tabulation.

^bIncludes CT and YETP CT in FY78.

CIncludes OJT and YETP OJT in FY78.

 $^{^{}m d}$ Includes YWE, YETP Other, and YCCIP in FY78.

e Includes PSE sustainment, PSE nonsustainment, and PSE unknown in FY78.

Table A.8

PERCENT OF ADULTS WHO GOT DESIRED OCCUPATION OF JOB TRAINING

		dition le Job			dition ale Jo		Mix	ted Job	•
Sex	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY76	FY7.7	FY78	FY76	FY77	FY78
Female Male		64.9 77.1	40.0 74.9	73.4 58.3	63.3 25.1	59.2 39.1		61.9 48.7	58.4 46.6

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